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EXPARTE YOUNG: SOVEREIGNTY, IMMUNITY, AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF
AMERICAN FEDERALISM
Charlton C. Copeland*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE U.S. Supreme Court's recent state-immunity jurisprudence requires
reconsideration. The call for reconsideration does not stem from an
absolutist rejection of all forms of state autonomy or immunity, but rather from a
fear that the Court's immunity jurisprudence is dislodged from its role in the
enforcement of the federalism structure of American government. This article
offers an account of the Court's seminal decision in Ex parte Young as a path
toward the reconsideration of state immunity case law.' This account of Ex parte
Young asserts that the dominant focus on Young in the state-immunity canon
obscures its important contribution to our understanding of state immunity,
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1. This account of Ex parte Young is an alternative reading. It is a relational account of the
Court's holding in Young. This account suggests that it is instructive to consider Young as a
judicial attempt to enforce the Constitution's federalism structure by resorting to the relationships
that arise from the political and institutional structures that the Constitution establishes, rather than
enforcing federalism by resorting to specific allocations of power between the national government
and the states. Although this article limits its discussion of relational-federalism enforcement
primarily to sovereign immunity, this alternative account of federalism enforcement can provide a
broader understanding of many federalisms disputes, including commandeering, the dormant
commerce clause, and abstention. I examine relational federalism enforcement in these and other
areas in Federalism Beyond Power: The Judicial Mediation of the National-State Relationship
(2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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particularly, and the enforcement of federalism, more broadly.2 Specifically,
Young elucidates the larger ideas and dynamics of federalism in two ways: (1) it
illustrates federalism's duality as established within the Constitution's
ambivalence between nationalist supremacy and state sovereignty; and (2) it
demonstrates that state sovereignty is conditioned on the legitimacy of the state's
claim to the status of a political community 3 in which the people are sovereign.
Although a longer description of Young follows below, the facts in Young
support the contention that it recognizes the tension between national supremacy
and state sovereignty in American federalism. The issue before the Court in
Young was a habeas appeal by the Minnesota Attorney General, who was in
federal custody on contempt. Attorney General Young was being held because
he had violated a federal court injunction against his effort to prosecute railroad
officials for violating a Minnesota maximum-fare statute. The federal court had
enjoined the state prosecution at the behest of officers from the railroad, who
contended that the state's attempt to regulate fares violated the Constitution.
Attorney General Young argued that the lower court's injunction violated
sovereign immunity because the suit was against the state in its sovereign
capacity. In a decision that fused both equity jurisprudence and state-immunity
doctrine, the Court sustained the lower court's injunction, holding that the suit
against a state officer for violating the Constitution was not a suit against the
state, and therefore state-immunity precedents did not apply.
The dominant account of Ex parte Young is demonstrated in the way that it
has been deployed in the immunity case law, and elsewhere, by both the
defenders and critics of the Court's jurisprudence. They have variously
2. Although discussed in more detail below, the dominant discussion of Ex parte Young
focuses primarily on whether its central holding relies on a "legal fiction" that characterizes
particular actions as state action for certain constitutional purposes and non-state action for other
purposes. The focus on the "legal fiction" dimension of Young relates to its status as either a
central component of, or departure from, general state immunity from suit. As argued below, an
alternative account of Ex parte Young allows us to cast this debate differently in a way that might
challenge the presumptions of both proponents and critics of state immunity doctrine.
3. Distinguished federalism scholars Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley have rejected the
contention that states are political communities that garner the allegiance of their citizens to any
extent that justifies respect for, or protection of the federal arrangements of the original
constitution, or other historical periods. For Rubin and Feeley, federalism is purely vestigial; it is a
relic of a past, whose uselessness mature constitutional thinkers must recognize. See Edward L.
Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv.
903, 950 (1994) (arguing against the protection of federalism on the basis that citizens' political
identities are "formed by their membership in the nation as a whole"). Rubin and Feeley seem to
have in mind a much thicker conception of political community than the conception that I offer.
Rubin and Feeley seem to argue that an authentic political community, one deserving of the level of
autonomy that any structure worthy of the name federalism would allow, is one that has a "separate
history or culture" from the central government. Id. at 944. They contend that there is no place in
the present-day United States that qualifies as a political community in this authentic sense. Id. at
947. 1 take this to be a hopelessly high bar for the test of the legitimacy of a federal structure of
government. Subunits of national governments may be deserving of the attributes of autonomy on
the grounds that they are formed by the democratic will of the people and they serve as spaces for
contesting what might become the inevitable hegemony of the center. For a discussion of the
purposes of political contestation in a federal, democratic state, see infra notes 31-32.
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characterized the Young doctrine as the linchpin of the Court's sovereign-
immunity decisions, as a narrow perversion of an otherwise legitimate state
immunity, and as the saving grace of an otherwise illegitimate doctrine.
The Court's sovereign-immunity majority has also attempted to defend its
decisions by reference to the Young doctrine,4 declaring that it plays an "essential
... part of our sovereign immunity doctrine."5 Indeed, the Court rebutted claims
that sovereign immunity neuters federal law by pointing to the availability of
Young actions as one of "several avenues [that] remain open for ensuring state
compliance with federal law." 6  Beyond refuting criticism of its sovereign-
immunity doctrine, the Court's related characterization of Young as necessary "if
the Constitution is to remain the supreme law of the land" 7 has served another
purpose. The Court has exploited this characterization of Young to defend the
legitimacy of state sovereign immunity. 8 In Alden v. Maine, the Court stated that
the Young doctrine is premised on the understanding that states are immune from
suit in both federal court and their own courts. 9 Therefore, Young establishes the
historical pedigree of state immunity from suit, to the extent that it allows the
vindication of federal law, and supports the legitimacy of state-immunity
jurisprudence.
In contrast to the Court's portrayal of Young as an integral component of its
sovereign-immunity jurisprudence, the Court's sovereign-immunity majority has
also depicted Young as a perversion of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity,
a perversion that must be strictly confined lest it threaten the rule to which it is a
mere exception. In Pennhurst v. Halderman,0 the Court described an earlier
decision as havin, "declined to extend the fiction of Young to encompass
retroactive relief."1  Despite having previously described the Young doctrine as
4. Ex parte Young stands for two crucial principles in American federalism jurisprudence.
The first is that Young overcomes the presumption against federal courts in equity enjoining
ongoing state litigation. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971). Second, and most
important for our purposes, is Young's holding that a state's constitutional immunity does not bar
suits for injunctive relief for ongoing state violations of federal rights. For a fuller discussion of the
circumstances surrounding Young, see infra Part IV.
5. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) (holding that states are immune from suits for
violations of federal law in their own courts).
6. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 n.16 (1996) (holding that Congress
could not abrogate state immunity from suit under its Commerce Clause authority).
7. Alden, 527 U.S. at 747.
8. See id
9. Id.
10. 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974), which held
that the Eleventh Amendment barred retroactive payments of benefits that had been wrongly
withheld, for the proposition that the Young doctrine could not be used to evade state immunity in
federal court where the only violation was of state law).
11. As discussed in the text, both defenders and detractors of the state-immunity doctrine
deploy the Young "fiction." I accept the incongruity between Young's doctrinal articulation that
strips the state actor of the State's protection for immunity purposes and the state-action
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires that there be a state actor for
constitutional obligations to attach. Notwithstanding this incongruity, the Young doctrine reveals
important truths about the basis of and limitations on state autonomy.
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"necessary" and as a successful attempt to "harmonize" state sovereign immunity
with the "vindication of federal rights," the Court nevertheless stated that "the
need to promote the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated to the
constitutional immunity of the States." 12
Critics of the Court's sovereign-immunity jurisprudence have not allowed
the Court's depiction of Young as the sine qua non of its case law to detract from
their admiration for Young's role in litigation to remedy state violations of federal
constitutional rights.' 3 As virtually all commentators assert, Young is one of the
Court's most important decisions.'4 Many admirers of Young have, nevertheless,
emphasized the extent to which it relies on a "legal fiction."'15 These scholars
describe Young as a legal fiction to exemplify the incoherence of the Court's
sovereign-immunity case law. Indeed, the entire doctrine of state sovereign
immunity is suspect to the extent that Young is an absolute necessity to vindicate
federal rights, and to the extent that it relies on a logically inconsistent transfer of
authority from the state to a private actor to protect Fourteenth Amendment
rights.' 6 As much as Young represents a triumph, it is of the tragic sort because
many interpret it as having made the most of the bad situation created by the
Court's earlier mistake.' 7  Young's acceptance of the then-existing dominant
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment's scope tarnishes the legal
community's celebration of it as a constitutional achievement.
Young stands in an almost uniquely awkward position in American
jurisprudence. One camp cherishes it because its status as the means to vindicate
federal rights is, in their minds, a narrow exception to an otherwise solid doctrine
of state immunity from suit. 18 The opposing camp distrusts it because it
represents an acceptance of state immunity as the background norm, which they
reject.' 9 In their various attempts to discredit the substance of the opposing
position vis-At-vis sovereign immunity, each camp characterizes Young's
12. Id. (internal citations omitted).
13. See, e.g., Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 106 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Ex parte Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the
principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured
elsewhere in the Constitution.").
14. Charles Alan Wright has said that "the doctrine of Ex parte Young seems indispensable to
the establishment of constitutional government and the rule of law." CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 48, at 314 (6th ed. 2002).
15. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 155 (1980) (describing Young as having a "distinct air of unreality about it"
because of the inconsistency between Young and the Fourteenth Amendment doctrine).
16. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1478-79
(1987).
17. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890). For criticism of Hans, see generally Edward
Purcell, The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race, History,
and "Federal Courts, " 81 N.C. L. REv. 1927 (2003).
18. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 14, § 48, at 314.
19. See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an
Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 435,437 (1962).
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vindication as a fiction, standing for no larger principle than that clearly allowed
for in the decision itself.2 °
Part II of this article lays the groundwork of an alternative account of Ex
parte Young, sovereign-immunity jurisprudence, and the enforcement of
federalism. It suggests a relational account as an alternative to the dominant
conception of American federalism, which is solely an allocation of power
between the national government and the states. According to the dominant
model, federalism disputes are adjudicated exclusively by determining which
side of the federalism divide possesses substantive authority. 21 One of the
benefits of a relational account of Young is its emphasis on the preservation of an
enduring, constitutionally inaugurated relationship between the national
government and the states that is capable of generating a "duty of good faith" and
constrains both parties.22 A relational model of federalism enforcement requires
that we focus on maintaining the federal system that the Constitution establishes,
which involves a tension between national supremacy and state sovereignty.
23
20. See, e.g., James Leonard, Ubi Remedium Ibi Jus, or, Where There's a Remedy, There's a
Right: A Skeptic's Critique ofEx parte Young, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 215, 365 (2004).
21. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1486 (1994)
(describing federalism as a structure that "regulates the allocation of power between state and
national governments"). Kramer's discussion was primarily aimed at better understanding the role
the political process plays in the distribution of substantive regulatory authority between the states
and the national government, yet Kramer's exclusive conception of federalism was as a governance
structure that allocated power. Most scholarly commentary on federalism has taken power
allocation to be the sole dimension of federalism. Here, the dominant question has been by what
process is power allocated, which has focused primarily on whether the political process ought to
be the sole or primary method of distributing substantive power between the national government
and the states, or whether the judiciary should impose bright-line, constitutionally based limitations
on the allocation of substantive authority. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
COURT (1980); Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REv. 795,
796 (1996) (contending that the dominant view of federalism "is that the existence of areas of
exclusive state power is a necessary condition of constitutional federalism").
22. My use of relational federalism is somewhat different than the normal conception of
"relationship" in constitutional interpretation. In constitutional interpretation, the term is used as a
contrast to a strict clause-bound interpretation of the Constitution, which involves deriving
constitutional meaning from the structures and interactions that the Constitution creates, without
regard to whether there is a specific textual clause for a specific conclusion. For the leading
articulation of structural or relational constitutional interpretation, see CHARLES L. BLACK,
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969); PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 74-93 (1982). Vicki Jackson refers to relational federalism as
a method of constitutional interpretation for federalism disputes involving the "judicial resolution
of issues involving not the interpretation of particular constitutional texts but the deeper questions
of structural relationships left unaddressed by the constitutional text." Vicki C. Jackson,
Comparative Constitutional Federalism and Transnational Judicial Discourse, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L.
91, 114 (2004).
23. The theory of imposing constraints from the relationship that is created by the federalism
structure is not wholly new. Various scholars have attempted to articulate examples of relational
federalism, usually by reference to comparative models of such method of analysis in other
countries' (usually Germany's) adjudication of federalism disputes. See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam,
Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of Federal Systems, 90 VA. L. REV. 731, 734-
35 (2004); Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative
UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LA WREVIEW
Part II also begins with a brief survey of the constitutional provisions that
inaugurate the relationship between the states and the national government. 24 It
then articulates the normative and theoretical descriptions of relational account of
federalism enforcement. Finally, this part offers examples of the relational
model and contrasts them with allocation models. 25  This discussion will
demonstrate how courts use both allocation and relational models to resolve
federalism disputes in defense of both national supremacy and state sovereignty
and autonomy.
The relational model, which calls for respect for national supremacy and
state sovereignty and autonomy-federalism's duality-is based on the extent to
which each represents distinct legitimate political communities. Indeed, the
national and state governments' legitimacy as political communities is
inextricably connected to the people as sovereign authority.26  Part III
demonstrates the genealogy of a second insight gained from a relational account
of Young, that is, state sovereignty is conditioned on the state's status as a
political community within the Constitution's meaning. This section asserts that
we must look back to the Court's decision in Texas v. White to understand the
basis of federalism's duality-the states' status as legitimate political
communities. This decision also articulates a conception of conditional
participation in sovereignty by the state, based on the conclusion that the state is
not hostile to the U.S. Constitution. Secondly, this section offers McCulloch v.
Constitutional Experience, 51 DuKE L.J. 223, 283-86 (2001). Each of these important discussions
reference what might be termed an "ethics" of federalism, which is guided more by the fact of
relationship rather than the explicit limits on the possession of substantive authority, whether such
authority is the result of the political process or derived from the Constitution. The recognition that
relationships are often the source of constraints apart from more formal sources of constraint have
been recognized in areas that extend far beyond federalism and separation-of-powers law. See,
e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relationships in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
Soc. REV. 55, 62 (1963) (arguing that the nature and length of relationships affect the resort to
formal contractual sanctions as a method of dispute resolution).
24. It is not novel to note that the national and state governments engage in a long-term,
complex relationship constructed by the Constitution. See William P. Marshall & Jason S. Cowart,
State Immunity, Political Accountability, and Alden v. Maine, 75 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 1086
(2000) ("[T]he states and the federal government have ongoing mutually interdependent
relationships. ). However, unlike some who note this fact, the argument presented here does not
suggest this ongoing relationship justifies the judicial abdication of a role in enforcing federalism,
see Kramer, supra note 21, at 1485; rather, this article argues that the relationship is generative of
bilateral principles of constraint that ought to be added to the judiciary's arsenal of federalism
enforcement.
25. My reliance on specific cases to serve as "ideal types" in no way suggests that a relational
model of federalism enforcement appears exclusively in any federalism dispute. My categorization
is best understood as highlighting particular dimensions of a particular case or set of cases, without
suggesting that this is the only modality of federalism enforcement present in any case.
Nevertheless, my divisions are based on an assertion about a dominant modality. In some respects,
even when the Court's rhetoric sounds in allocation, its reasoning might be best characterized as
relational. For a more extensive discussion of this, see Copeland, Federalism Beyond Power, supra
note 1.
26. See Amar, supra note 16, at 1426-27 (asserting that all federalism disputes should be
adjudicated by reference to their consistency with the principle of popular sovereignty).
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Maryland as an example of the Court's articulation of the Constitution as
establishing a national political community at whose head stand the People.
Part IV interprets Ex parte Young as a decision involving relational
federalism in the context of state immunity. Beyond Young's relational aspects,
this part demonstrates Young's commitment to the principle of a conditional state
sovereignty. While Young recognizes the states' right to some participation in
sovereignty, the decision rests on a mandate that states must be accountable to
the citizens with whom they are in political relationship. Further, Young
recognizes the limits on the state's relationship with its citizenry in light of its
political relationship with the national government. Young, therefore,
transformed sovereign-immunity case law by bringing it closer to convergence
with the competing dimensions of American federalism in the context of political
relationships and accountability.
Part V demonstrates the extent to which the Rehnquist Court's sovereign-
immunity jurisprudence involved relational federalism. Part V contends that the
Court's affirmation of Congress's substantive authority to enact remedial
legislation can be distinguished from other federalism case law that clearly
rejected Congress's substantive authority. The Alden Court seemed to suggest
that despite possessing substantive regulatory authority, the national
government's means of effectuating its authority are inconsistent with the
Constitution's federal structure. Part V also demonstrates the extent to which the
Rehnquist Court's immunity revolution failed to take seriously the Young
doctrine's underpinnings, which would have required it to take the national
political relationship as seriously as it took the state's political relationship in
adjudicating disputes over state sovereign immunity.
II. ENFORCING FEDERALISM: ALLOCATION AND RELATIONAL MODELS
A. The Constitutional Basis of Relationship
The argument that constitutional and political structures are capable of
building enduring relationships that generate duties of loyalty to constrain the
states and the national government presumes that the Constitution actually
creates such relationships. This section briefly describes the structures that
establish the interactions that serve as the fundamental element in this argument.
According to the Constitution's original design, state governments play a central
role in selecting the holders of every democratically accountable institution of the
national government. Even after the Seventeenth Amendment's passage, which
instituted popular election of members of the U.S. Senate, the states play an
important role in structuring the national government.
Article I of the Constitution establishes the national legislative body and
describes the qualifications for membership in each chamber and the method by
which representatives are to be chosen. The states are connected to each. The
members of the House of Representatives are to be chosen "every second Year"
by the "People of the several States." To qualify for service in the House of
849
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Representatives, a member must "be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall
be chosen."2 7 The members of the House are distributed "among the several
States," based on the state's population. Each state is guaranteed at least one
representative in the House of Representatives.
Article I, Section 3 of Constitution establishes the second chamber of the
national legislature, the Senate. Each state, regardless of its population, is
represented by two members, each of whom is chosen by the state's legislature.
Like members of the House of Representatives, to qualify to represent a State in
the Senate, a member must be "an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be
chosen."
28
As with the selection of members of Congress, the states play an
indispensable role in selecting the President. Article II, Section 1 establishes the
manner in which the President is elected. A state receives an elector for each of
its members of the Senate and House of Representatives in Congress. Even
further, the original constitution required that electors would meet in their
respective states to cast votes for two candidates for President.
B. Relational Model of Federalism Enforcement Explained
It is a legitimate question to ask why the federal arrangement requires
enforcement at all. That is, what purpose does federalism serve such that its
demise would be detrimental to any particular national regime? Some have
suggested that, at least within the American context, protections of federalism are
a peculiar "neurosis" in American political culture.29 Others have suggested that
the centrifugal forces of modem American government are so strong that
American federalism, far from being vestigial, has imploded. 30  Each of these
positions suggests that there is nothing left of federalism to protect, either
because it is useless in the modem administrative state or because it has been so
battered that it is beyond protection. This article rejects both of these positions
and contends that a justification remains for federalism that legitimizes efforts to
protect it. In brief, this article accepts federalism as a system of governance that
gives a larger polity's geographical subunits the ability to articulate alternative
substantive norms than those articulated by the national polity. 31 Federalism
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
28. Id. § 3, cl. 3.
29. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 3, at 903.
30. See ROBERT NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 13 (2001).
31. This conception of federalism is consistent with various conceptions of federalism as a
structure that allows particular kinds of minorities, whether ethnic, religious, or political, to
exercise a certain level of decisional autonomy over some issues to join a central state. Although
some conceptions of federalism are based on a "thick" conception of identity, such as race,
language, or religion, federalism can also be justified on the basis of the comparatively "thinner"
identity of "political loser." That is, federalism allows political losers at the national level to have
access to a space to articulate alternative or competing norms of those adopted by the central
government. To be clear, federalism's subunits are not allowed infinite space to articulate such
norms, but federalism provides space from which losers at the national level might offer alternative
norms that contest the norms of the central government. As can be seen, my disagreement with
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challenges the national government's status as the unitary decider in all things,
and as such, serves to open space for differentiation from and contestation with
the center by those who presumably have failed in their attempts to control the
national government.
32
From the Republic's earliest days, those concerned with protecting the
states' decisional autonomy from the national government's usurpation have
contended that protecting America's federal structure of government is done best
by allocating the powers of each government level.33  At several points
throughout American history, the courts have sought to protect the integrity of
the federalism structure by allocating power based on distinctions between local
Professors Rubin and Feeley centers on their justification of federalism as necessarily tied to
political identities that are far thicker than needed. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 3, at 942
(connecting separate or divided political identities to ethnic, linguistic, religious, or cultural
differences). Further, federalism can be justified by the realization that nations continue to be
composed of a variety of competing conceptions of "the good," which might be capable of
accommodation under a federal structure of government. This conception of federalism is not
parasitic upon being able to identify ex ante those who might benefit from some form of regional
autonomy, because all can conceivably see themselves as potential political losers at the national
level. Under this conception, federalism is a structure that prevents contestation at the national
level from being a "fight for all the marbles," in which either side is incentivized to wage "total
war" against a particular opponent because all is either won or lost at the national level.
32. See Seth F. Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI., Mar.
2001, at 66. Kreimer's conception of the role that federalism plays in making political contestation
possible comes close to the idea that I advance. He argued that the existence of subunits of the
national government with the capacity for at least minimal articulation of "the existence of
alternatives to the authority of the national government can legitimate political opposition to
repression in ways that would be unattainable in the absence of a diffusion of political authority."
Id. at 71. Further, he argued that the existence of "alternative political visions," which may be
more easily fostered in a federal structure, "makes it more difficult to demonize and extirpate
political dissenters ... [and may] provide the platform for efforts to oust potentially repressive
leaders by political means." Id. at 70. While I accept much of what Kreimer said, I am uncertain
that it is bolstered by the threat of an oppressive national regime. That is, even a non-repressive
regime can benefit from the form of contestation that federalism makes possible. Its legitimacy
need not be parasitic on the tyrannical potential of the central government.
33. The Framers responded to criticism that the Constitution would create a government that
would trample over the states and make them superfluous in the governance of the new nation in
part by minimizing the threat that the national government would pose to the states, and by arguing
that the separation of powers between the two levels of government would protect the states.
Writing in favor of the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton stated:
It may be said that it would tend to render the government of the Union too powerful, and to
enable it to absorb in itself those residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to
leave with the States for local purposes. Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of power ....
I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptations the persons entrusted with the
administration of the general government could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities
of that description. The regulation of the mere domestic police of the States appears to hold
out slender allurements to ambition. Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to
comprehend all the objects, which have charms for minds governed by that passion; and all
the powers necessary to these objects ought in the first instance to be lodged in the national
depository.
THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 106 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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versus non-local,34 and economic versus non-economic activities.35  Such
divisions of power are thought to establish a zone of exclusivity for the national
and state governments. The enforcement of fidelity to the federalist structure is
thought to be best achieved through preventing incursions by either level on the
terrain of the other level of government.
A relational conception of federalism suggests that allocation is not the
exclusive method to ensure national and state fidelity to the federal arrangement.
Like allocational conceptions of federalism, relational conceptions of federalism
are premised on enforcing the federalism arrangement against national and state
"cheating." Nevertheless, relational conceptions of federalism enforcement are
not wedded to the notion that allocating regulatory authority between the national
and state governments, and subsequent policing of the boundaries, is the sole way
of ensuring fidelity to the federal arrangement. Further, relational conceptions of
federalism suggest that an incursion on substantive regulatory authority is not the
only way that the federal arrangement can be undermined. The federal
arrangement might be undermined even where a particular level of government is
legitimately operating within its sphere of substantive regulatory authority. By
relying solely on allocation to enforce fidelity to the federal arrangement,
allocation does not adequately protect the federal structure of government.
34. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (invalidating the Child Labor Act, which
prohibited the interstate transportation of goods produced in factories employing underage children
as exerting power over "purely local matters to which the federal authority does not extend").
35. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560-61 (1995) (invalidating portions of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act on the basis that the Congress's Commerce Clause authority over intrastate
activity was limited to "economic activity").
36. Jenna Bednar and William Eskridge argued that maintaining federal arrangements is the
goal of enforcing federalism. They contend that all parties to the federal arrangement have
incentives to "cheat on the federal arrangement" in ways that will undermine it. Jenna Bednar &
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial
Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1447, 1473-74 (1995). Using a variation of the
prisoner's dilemma, they argue that both the national government and the states are incentivized to
cheat in their commitment to adhering to the requirements of a federal structure of government by,
for example, the national government's "legislating aggressively and preemptively in areas
traditionally left to the states," id. at 1473, or by a state's failure to participate in the
"implementation and enforcement" of national policies with which it disagrees, or through the
creation of externalities that negatively affect national policy priorities or other state governments.
Id. at 1474.
37. Relational conceptions of federalism are similar to the anti-aggrandizement principle
articulated in separation-of-power jurisprudence. For example, in Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S.
163 (1994), the Court upheld the constitutionality of the appointments process of military trial
judges. Military trial judges were to be appointed from among the ranks of already-commissioned
officers. Id. at 168. They had been appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause, but did not
receive a second appointment to the office of military trial judge. Id. at 170. The lack of a second
appointment was challenged as a violation of the Appointments Clause requirements. Id. at 165.
The Court determined that the statute providing for their appointment was not unconstitutional, in
part, because it concluded that Congress had not attempted to aggrandize power to itself at the
expense of the President by endowing previously appointed officers with additional duties. Id. at
188-91. Similarly, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of non-Article II judges entertaining common-law suits, in part, because it
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The so-called "federalism revolution, ' 38 which primarily took place during
the Rehnquist Court era, marked the Supreme Court's return to its role as
protector of America's federal structure through the placement of constitutional
limitations on national legislative authority.39 The Court's foray into disputes
between the national government and the states was marked by an increased
solicitousness toward the threats that certain impositions of national-policy
priorities posed for the integrity of state governments. 40  Although the early
forays into judicial enforcement of federalism were primarily aimed at the
process rather than the substance of federalism, 4 1 the Court's later federalism
decisions expanded by invalidating, as unconstitutional, substantive exercises of
42
congressional authority in both United States v. Lopez and in United States v.
Morrison.43 The Court's enforcement of federalism moved to include new
articulations of the constitutional protection of states from suit in federal court.
As stated above, the dominant interpretation of the federalism revolution
generally, and the sovereign-immunity case law particularly, is that it has
resulted in an allocation of substantive authority away from the national
concluded that Congress was not attempting to undermine Article III courts. 478 U.S. 833, 854-55
(1986).
38. Although the concern for the integrity of states is present in earlier eras, see, e.g., Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971) (holding that federal courts were obligated to abstain from
hearing constitutional claims in cases brought plaintiffs challenging their ongoing state, criminal
prosecutions), the Court's sensitivity to the states' interests increased significantly during the
Rehnquist Court era, see, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act Amendments, which required states to
take title to radioactive waste in the absence of a disposal plan, as unconstitutional commandeering
of the state legislative process); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991) (holding that the
provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not apply to state mandatory
retirement-age requirements for appointed state-court judges absent a clear statutory statement).
For a discussion of these cases as calling for a new form of interaction between the national
government and the states, see Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of
Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1988 S. CT. REV. 71.
39. The Court's decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985),
marked the Court's rejection of a strong judicial presence in the enforcement of the Constitution's
federal structure. There, the Court reversed its only-decade-old decision in National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which was the first time since the New Deal that the Court
invalidated a congressional statute on federalism grounds. In Garcia, the Court declared that the
political process was a sufficient institutional enforcer of the Constitution's federal structure.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531. See also Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The
Jurisprudence of Federalism after Garcia, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 341, 341-42 (discussing the
significance of Garcia in relation to the Court's theory of federalism).
40. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460 (describing the state's mandatory retirement system as "a
decision of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity").
41. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REv. 633,
658 (1993) (describing the federalism constraints of New York v. United States as "one of process
and not substance"); Rapaczynski, supra note 39, at 359-68.
42. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress lacked the authority to enact portions of the
Gun-Free Schools Zones Act).
43. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked the authority to enact portions of the
Violence Against Women Act).
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government (and its courts) to the states. 4 Such an interpretation traffics in the
conception of federalism as exclusively a governance structure that allocates
power between the national government and the states, despite evidence that the
Court's federalism jurisprudence has also resorted to less absolute mechanisms of
enforcing federalism than mere line drawing. Such a cramped conception of
American federalism underwrites the misperception (of scholars and the Court
itself) of state immunity's role in protecting federalism. The perception that the
enforcement of federalism is exclusively about power allocation distorts the way
state-immunity doctrine is deployed as a tool in the arsenal of federalism's
enforcement. That is, if power allocation is all there is, state-immunity doctrine
must be interpreted in ways that endow states with absolute vetoes to private
suits. A relational conception of federalism need not reach such a conclusion,
but might allow more flexibility while always sensitive to the need to protect
state integrity. Understanding the Young doctrine's role in state-immunity
jurisprudence, particularly, and federalism jurisprudence, more generally, from
this perspective provides opportunities to understand it and our federal structure
more fully.
The sovereign-immunity revolution45 is a central component of the larger
federalism revolution inaugurated by the Rehnquist Court.46 The Rehnquist
Court's federalism decisions are marked by a greater sympathy to state
governments' independence and autonomy in the nation's constitutional
47framework, affirmatively limiting the scope of Congress's legislative powers.
The state-immunity cases, however, differ from the legislative-federalism case
law, as they represent a limitation on the range of Congress's remedial choices
rather than a limitation on Congress's authority to enact substantive rights
44. See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT
SIDES WITH THE STATES (2002) (describing the Supreme Court's sovereign immunity case law as
ratcheting back the national government's substantive authority).
45. The sovereign-immunity revolution is marked by several cases decided during the
Rehnquist Court era, which collectively held that states were immune from suit for violations of
federal law in federal courts, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68 (1996), state
courts, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757-58 (1999), and administrative agencies, Federal
Maritime Commission v. South Carolina, 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002).
46. See M. Elizabeth Magill, The Revolution That Wasn't, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 47, 48 (2004)
("The Rehnquist Court has worked important changes in the doctrines relating to federalism. For
the first time since the post-New Deal period, the Court has invalidated some acts of Congress as
beyond the scope of the commerce power, making clear in the process that there are some judicially
enforceable outer limits on the scope of that power."); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of
Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 306-08 (2005) (including the Court's recent
sovereign-immunity case law as consistent with the Rehnquist Court's broader normative
conception of federalism cases); Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of
Federalism, 1999 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 3 (categorizing the Rehnquist Court's federalism jurisprudence
as having a "propensity toward immunity federalism," which "protects state governments
themselves from direct molestation at the hands of the federal government").
47. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (invalidating provisions of
the Violence Against Women Act on the ground that the statute exceeded Congress's authority
under both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free Schools Zone Act as beyond
Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause).
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guarantees. 48 To this extent, the state-immunity case law is arguably consistent
with the position that Congress is the best institutional enforcer of federalism
limitations on its authority.49 At the same time, these cases hold that the
availability of retroactive remedies for state violations, with some exceptions,
50
should be left to the state governments acting in their independent capacity.
51
C. Contrasting Allocation and Relational Models of Federalism Enforcement
The cases discussed in this section provide examples of the contrasting
modalities of federalism enforcement-the allocation and relational models,
respectively. As stated above, the categorization of these cases into "types" is
not meant to suggest that judges partake of one mode exclusively. Instead, it is
meant to suggest that either allocation or relational dimensions of a particular
case might be more dominant. Each case below involves a federalism dispute of
one sort or another-either a dispute over the scope of Congress's regulatory
authority under the Commerce Clause, or a dispute over the duty of state courts
to entertain federal statutory cases. The cases are divided into two types: cases
that defend the federal arrangement in favor of the national government (Union
and Supremacy), and cases that defend the arrangement in favor of the states
(Separation and Autonomy). The cases are then divided into the two
enforcement modalities-allocation and relational.52
48. See Ann Althouse, The Alden Trilogy: Still Searching for a Way to Enforce Federalism,
31 RUTGERS L.J. 631, 659 (2000) ("If Congress wants adequate enforcement [of federal rights], it is
going to have to come up with the money for it and put the decision making about when and how to
enforce into the hands of publicly accountable executive branch officials.").
49. The classic statement on the political safeguards of federalism enforcement is Herbert
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954). See also Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530-31 (1985) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards
Act's requirement obligating state and local governments to pay minimum wage and overtime to
their employees, and overturning its earlier decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976), on the ground that states were adequately represented in the national legislature).
50. Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity for damage suits pursuant to its authority
to remedy constitutional violations under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). Despite Bitzer's affirmation of Congress's Section 5 authority
to abrogate state sovereign immunity, the Rehnquist Court invalidated several statutes aimed at
allowing private suits against states for violations of federal statutes. See, e.g., Bd. of Tr. of Univ.
of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (invalidating portions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act on the ground that Congress had not abrogated state immunity under its remedial
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62, 91 (2000) (same with respect to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). But see Nevada
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738-40 (2003) (upholding the Family Medical Leave Act's private-suit
provision as a legitimate exercise of Congress's Section 5 authority).
51. Schapiro, supra note 46, at 308.
52. It is worth noting that the mere existence of relational reasoning in the Court's enforcement
of federalism does not suggest approval of the Court's result. Where I have suggested, at a fairly
high level of generality, that a case might be included as an example of relational reasoning in
federalism does not a priori suggest that it has undertaken relational analysis to good result.
Although an appropriate test of any model's utility is a measure of how helpful it is as an
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1. Union and Supremacy
i. Power-allocation model: McCulloch v. Maryland
53
As discussed earlier, the power-allocation model suggests that the national-
state relationship is regulated exclusively by determining whether one or both
levels of government possess a particular power.54  If only one level of
government possesses the power, then that level has a veto over any
encroachments on the exercise of the power by the other level of government.
5
If the power is shared, then the national government's power, as supreme, trumps
the state's exercise of concurrent power.56 Scholars have described the Court's
epochal decision in McCulloch v. Maryland as having set the framework for the
expansion of congressional power because of its broad reading of the Necessary
and Proper Clause.57 This section will demonstrate, however, that the Court's
articulation of Congress's power was premised, in part, on being the limit of the
states' power.
In McCulloch, the Court addressed the question of the legitimacy of a state-
imposed tax on the Bank of the United States.58  The Court's analysis
emphasized the impact that a state-imposed tax would have on the national
government's ability to achieve its constitutionally authorized functions. The
Court's decision, though frequently referring to the Union of the United States,
emphasized the case as involving "conflicting powers." 59 The Court held that
Maryland's tax violated the Constitution, primarily because of Congress's
substantive authority to charter the national bank.60  Even though the Court
confessed that the explicit authority to establish a national bank was not listed in
the Constitution, the Court explained that the formation of a national bank was a
explanatory tool in deciding why cases are decided one way as against another, no model is free of
the possibility that it might be employed inconsistently.
53. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
54. See, e.g., Gardbaum, supra note 21, at 796-97.
55. E.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb,
121 HARV. L. REv. 941, 1026 n.335 (2008) (citing JAMES HART, THE ORDINANCE MAKING POWERS
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 239-40 (1925)) (explaining the presidential veto as a
means to prevent encroachment on exclusive powers).
56. U.S. CONST. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.").
57. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L.
REv. 1693, 1729 n. 122 (2008) (stating that the McCulloch Court interpreted broad powers under the
Necessary and Proper Clause).
58. The State of Maryland enacted a statute that imposed a tax on all banks or bank branches
within the State of Maryland that had not been chartered by the legislature. The history of the
chartering of the Bank of the United States raised constitutional questions throughout the life of the
Bank. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE: 1789-2008, at 66-69
(2009).
59. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 400.
60. Id. at 437.
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"means of executing" explicitly delegated congressional authority.6 1 Thus the
Court's holding flowed from its first locating constitutional authority that could
be interpreted to permit Congress's establishment of a national bank. The Court
declared that determining the legitimacy of the means of exercising valid
substantive authority was solely within the national legislature's discretion.62
The Court said:
The government which has the right to do an act, and has imposed on it the duty
of performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select
the means; and those who contend that it may not select any appropriate means, that
one particular mode of effecting the object is excepted, take upon themselves the
burden of establishing that exception.
... In America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the government of
the Union, and those of the states. They are each sovereign, with respect to the
objects committed to it, and neither sovereign, with respect to the objects committed
to the other.
63
The Constitution's commission of a power to one level of government
seemingly adjudicates the relationship between the national government and the
states in a particular dispute. According to the Court, the exclusive possession of
substantive authority is sufficient to adjudicate disputes between the states and
the national government.6 4  Once the Court establishes the constitutionality of
Congress's substantive authority, the inquiry ends.6 5 The Court declared, "Let
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional."
66
ii. Federal-relationship model: Testa v. Katt
67
The relational concept of federalism enforcement contends that the
obligations that regulate national and state interactions go beyond the duty not to
infringe on the authority of the other level of government. Rather, an emphasis
on the relational dimension of federalism enforcement asserts that each level of
government owes a duty to the other even when exercising legitimately
61. Id. at411.
62. Id. at 409-10.
63. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 409-10 (1819).
64. See id at 411 (explaining that the power to create a corporation is not exclusively the
province of the federal government because the power is not "a great substantive and independent
power").
65. Id. at421.
66. Id.
67. Testa II, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
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possessed regulatory authority. 68 Under a model of relational federalism, the
relationships between the two entities can also govern interactions between the
states and federal government.6 9 This section uses case law to demonstrate how
the Court's federalism jurisprudence recognizes the relational dimension of
federalism enforcement. Through the Court's seminal decision in Testa v. Katt,
this section aims to demonstrate how the Court justified certain impositions on
state courts.
In Testa, the Court faced an appeal from the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island, which had held that state courts could not entertain suits under the
Emergency Price Control Act,7 1 because the Act provided for treble damages
against those convicted of selling goods above an established maximum price.72
A state court held that its courts could not entertain such a case because of the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island's decision holding that state courts must not
enforce a foreign government's penal laws.7 3 The Court responded to the state's
holding by declaring:
[W]e cannot accept the basic premise on which the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that it has no more obligation to enforce a valid penal law of the United States
than it has to enforce a penal law of another state or foreign country. Such a broad
assumption flies in the face of the fact that the States of the Union constitute the
nation.74
The Court justified its holding by referencing the congressional conferral of
jurisdiction on state courts to "enforce important federal civil laws," which, in
68. See Schapiro, supra note 46, at 248-49 (advancing a polyphony model of federalism where
the "dynamic interaction among states and the federal government represent independent voices of
authority").
69. See id. at 249.
70. This article does not contend that relational conception of federalism is the exclusive form
of federalism. It argues that by paying attention to the relational dimension in federalism case law,
we might begin to think differently of the alternatives to the adjudication of federalism disputes.
71. Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (1942).
72. Testa ll, 330 U.S. at 387. Section 205(e) provided:
If any person selling a commodity violates a regulation, order, or price schedule prescribing a
maximum price or maximum prices, the person who buys such commodity for use or
consumption other than in the course of trade or business may, within one year from the date
of the occurrence of the violation, except as hereinafter provided, bring an action against the
seller on account of the overcharge. In such action, the seller shall be liable for reasonable
attorney's fees and costs as determined by the court, plus whichever of the following sums is
the greater: (1) Such amount not more than three times the amount of the overcharge, or the
overcharges, upon which the action is based as the court in its discretion may determine, or
(2) an amount not less than $25 nor more than $50, as the court in its discretion may
determine: ... Any action under this subsection by either the buyer or the Administrator, as
the case may be, may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction....
56 Stat. 32, as amended, 58 Stat. 632, 640 (1942).
73. Testa v. Katt (Testa 1), 47 A.2d 312, 313-14 (R.I. 1946).
74. Testa I, 330 U.S. at 389.
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turn, established evidence of the relationship between the federal and state
governments. 5
Further, the Court accepted the state's authority to establish the
jurisdictional boundaries of its courts. At no point does the Court seem to
suggest that the state is without the substantive authority to articulate state-court
jurisdictional boundaries as it chooses; the entire decision traffics in the
assumption that the state is in full possession of this quantum of sovereignty.
Nevertheless, the Court declared that the exercise of such authority, despite the
fact that it does not invade any domain in exclusive possession of the national
government, is a threat to the government's federal structure because it
discriminates against federal claims simply because they are federal claims. The
Court ruled that, absent a neutral procedural rule that treats both state and federal
actions the same, a state is not free to dislodge itself from the duties of its
relationship with the national government.76 The relationship in this context
demands that states respect their union with the national government, which
prohibits treating the national government as though it were a foreign entity.
77
The Court's decision balanced the precedents recognizing state courts'
substantive authority to establish and exercise their own procedural rules against
the potentially contradicting dictates of the states' duty not to treat federal claims
with disdain.
75. Id. at 390. Such a congressional conferral of a mandatory duty to state courts to entertain
suits involving federal law clearly raises the suspicion that the Congress has commandeered the
state-court system by obligating state courts to entertain federal suits. The Court has, however,
rejected the assertion that imposing such an obligation amounts to unconstitutional commandeering
based on a distinction that a state court's duty to apply federal law is dictated by the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution versus no complementary provision mandating state executive officers to
administer federal law. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929 (1997). Although the
Court's later reliance on the commandeering case law to support its holding in Alden v. Maine that
states are immune from suit in their own courts seems sufficiently narrow that Testa's holding is
not threatened. See James Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority and the
Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 191. 227 n. 154 (2007)
(explaining the congruence between Alden and Testa). It is significant that the Court's justification
of Testa's holding appears to rely on an allocation conception of federalism enforcement. This is
not surprising, or even fatal to relational federalism, in light of the fact that relational federalism is
but one dimension of federalism. It is not the exclusive way of considering federalism disputes,
and a single case can certainly exhibit dimensions of both relation and allocation. For an
alternative to the Court's Supremacy Clause justification of Testa's holding, which also relies on a
power-allocation model of federalism, see generally Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver,
Federal Power to Commandeer State Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism,
32 IND. L. REV. 71 (1998) (offering a justification of Testa II on the basis of the Necessary and
Proper Clause).
76. Testall, 330 U.S. at 389.
77. The Court's decision in Testa H is complemented by the Court's decisions holding that it
will not imply a congressional withdrawal of state-court review of federal claims absent a clear
statement. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372-73 (1990); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 461
(1990). But see Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1872) (denying state courts authority to
entertain habeas petitions against the federal government).
78. Testa v. Katt (Testa 11), 330 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1947).
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2. Separation and Autonomy
i. Power-allocation model: United States v. Lopez
7 9
The Court's landmark decision in Lopez revived the judicial enforcement of
substantive limits on Congress's regulatory authority.8 0 Along the continuum of
judicial resolution of disputes over the exercise of national or state authority,
Lopez is easily a case whose resolution depends almost exclusively on allocating
power between the national government and the states.8s In Lopez, the Court
explicitly declared that the matter Congress sought to regulate-guns sold in
interstate commerce within 1000 feet of a designated school zone-exceeded the
scope of its substantive legislative authority under the Commerce Clause. 82 The
Court's decision resolved the federalism dispute by almost exclusive reference to
the nature of activities-economic versus non-economic-that Congress could
regulate pursuant to the Constitution's Commerce Clause.8 3 Concluding that the
regulation of guns in school zones was a non-economic regulation, the Court
invalidated the statute.
84
The Court's analysis began by declaring that the national government is a
government of "enumerated powers," which are "few and defined., 85 The Court
continued by connecting the Framers' vision of separated powers to the goal of
protecting of liberty. 86 The main objective of the Court's opinion was to define
and articulate the boundaries of Congress's commerce power.8 7 Though the
Court conceded that post-New Deal era decisions have relaxed the overly
79. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
80. National League of Cities is usually taken to be the Court's first foray into the judicially
enforced, federalism-based limits on Congress's legislative authority, but for reasons that will be
described below, National League of Cities might be read differently, in that the Court's opinion
suggests that its invalidation of the congressional statute at issue in that dispute might not have
been held to have exceeded Congress's substantive authority. See infra note 106.
81. See MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003). Professor Tushnet offers
an alternative reading of the Court's decision in Lopez, which does not subscribe to an allocation
conception of federalism enforcement. Rather than reading the decision as defining "some
substantive area of regulatory authority reserved to the states," id. at 40-41, Tushnet contends that
the decision might be read as a judicial response to "particularly egregious exercises of truly
expansive views of national power," id. at 40, rather than a clear line-drawing exercise. Although
Tushnet's explanation is clearly attractive-it explains the consequences of the Court's decision
and its potential long-term impact-the decision's reasoning clearly relies on a presumption that
some activities are beyond the scope of national regulatory authority. Admittedly, Professor
Tushnet's argument is supported by the Court's indication that Congress's failure to include a
"jurisdictional nexus," which would have required that gun possession giving rise to federal
criminal charges be connected to interstate commerce in the text of the Gun-Free School Zones
Act, impacted their invalidation of the statutory provision.
82. The statute at issue was the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A)
(2000). See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
83. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 552.
86. Id. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
87 Id at 559
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formalist constraints on Congress's authority, it labored to establish that even
those cases recognized that federalism constraints impose a limit on Congress's
exercise of its authority.88
Having characterized Congress's authority as limitable by the dictates of
federalism, the Court's analysis focused on articulating the limits of
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. 89 Its inquiry centered on
determining whether the congressional regulation of handgun possession within
school zones would "substantially effect" commerce and thus bring it within the
scope of Congress's approved regulatory authority. 90 Answering in the negative,
the Court articulated a conception of federalism that it discovered in reviewing its
post-New Deal precedents. 91 The Court stated that its expansion of congressional
regulatory authority under the "substantial effects" test affirmed Congress's
attempt to regulate economic activity. 92  Of the statute at issue in Lopez, the
Court said, "[The Act] is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do
with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might
define the term." 93 The Court drew from its precedents a clear intention to limit
congressional regulation of intrastate activity substantially affecting interstate
commerce to one particular subject matter--economic activity.94  The Court
rejected the government's aggregation of the myriad non-commercial effects of
guns in school zones as having no limiting principle.9s
The Court's decision in Lopez, drawing on constitutional structure, declared
federalism as the limit on national power. 96 The opinion suggests that federalism
demands that there be another allocation of power, that within the state's sole
possession.9 7 Lopez suggests that if courts do not resolve federalism disputes by
resort to allocating power between the national government and the states, states
will cease to exist in the form that the Constitution requires. 98 The Court's
decision not only clearly demonstrates the power-allocation model, it appears to
offer this model even when it becomes difficult to articulate the substantive
quantum of authority exclusively possessed by the states.
88. See id. at 556-57.
89. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-57 (1995).
90. Id. at 557. See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 40 (1937)
(holding that Congress could regulate intrastate activity that had a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce).
91. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 563-64.
96. See id at 561 n.3.
97. See id. at 564.
98. Id. at 563-64 (citing Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 37).
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ii. Federal-relationship model: National League of Cities v. Usery99
Though many characterize National League of Cities as a decision that
narrowed the scope of Congress's substantive regulatory authority with respect to
state governments, °° this section demonstrates the ways in which it clearly
sounded in relational terms. Many consider the Court's decision a classic
example of power allocation because the decision seems to rest exclusively on
the fact that Congress had sought to exercise its authority over states in areas that
constitute "traditional government functions." 10 1  The search for traditional
government functions seems so clearly related to a search for core areas of
exclusive state authority that National League of Cities suggests that the
resolution of the dispute between the national government and the states will be
settled when such a search is complete. 10 2 In overruling National League of
Cities less than a decade later, however, the Court asserted that its reversal lay, in
part, in the difficulty of administering rules regarding "traditional government
functions."
10 3
Although it would be foolhardy to suggest that National League of Cities
avoided all references to power allocation, a strict power-allocation reading fails
to appreciate the ways in which the Court's decision demonstrates the relational
dimension of federalism jurisprudence. The Court's decision began with an
announcement of the "essential role of the States in our federal system of
government."' 10 4 Although the Court began to speak of the difference between
congressional assertion of power over individuals versus states, suggesting that it
was endowing the states with an absolute veto right against congressional
impositions on states, its rationale for rebuffing Congress's imposition of
minimum-wage requirements on state governments went beyond a declaration
that Congress is without substantive authority.10 5 The Court stated, "We have
repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every
state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress
may lack an affirmative legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the
Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner."106 While
99. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
100. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY
23 (2008) (describing National League of Cities as having placed a limit on congressional power);
Lawrence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the
Future-Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 138 (1999).
101. Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854-55.
102. Id. at 845.
103. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) ("[T]he attempt to
draw boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of 'traditional governmental function' is not
only unworkable, but also inconsistent with established principles of federalism.....
104. Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 844.
105. See id. at 845.
106. Id. (emphasis added). National League of Cities did not endow states with an absolute veto
over congressional action that might trespass on "traditional governmental functions," which is
supported by the Court's declaration that its decision was consistent with its precedent in Maryland
v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). Wirtz upheld congressional authority to impose a temporary freeze
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the Court seemed reticent to declare that Congress lacked the substantive
authority to extend minimum-wage requirements to state governments, the Court
did not hesitate to declare that there are limitations on congressional action, even
where it is unable to make a specific power-allocation decision.'
0 7
As it did in Testa, the Court interpreted the Constitution to have given the
states an essential role in the federal system1 ° 8 The Court's opinion suggests that
the relationship requires that the states retain some characteristic of a "separate
and independent existence."' 1 9 The Court rejected Congress's extension of its
minimum-wage and maximum-hour legislation to state governments because
such an extension threatened the independent existence of the state governments
by "displac[ing] state policies regarding the manner in which [states] structure
delivery of those governmental services which their citizens require.'
10
III. POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
FEDERALISM'S PERPETUAL TENSION
The Constitution clearly contemplates that state governments have
functioning political systems that are separate from, and not reliant on, the
Constitution's structural framework."' The Constitution is almost completely
silent regarding the structure of state governments even though various national
governmental institutions' structures partially rely on a certain form of
government in the states. For example, Article I assumes the existence of state
legislative bodies: Section 2 sets the qualifications of the electors for members
of the House of Representatives as the same as the qualifications for "Electors of
the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature."' 12 Likewise, membership in
on wages of state- and local-government employees pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 183. The Court stated, "The [Economic Stabilization Act] was
occasioned by an extremely serious problem which endangered the well-being of all the component
parts of our federal system and which only collective action by the National Government might
forestall." Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 853. The Court then attempted to distinguish the
intrusion at issue in Wirtz from the intrusion in National League of Cities, stating that the effect of
an across-the-board salary freeze did not displace the state's authority to structure government
services. Id. Though the Court's distinction appears to be strained, it nevertheless established the
Court's recognition of the legitimacy of a relational conception of federalism. The Court's
approval of Wirtz might be read as confirming a relational obligation that states owe to the federal
system in that they must sacrifice authority even where they might otherwise be sovereign for the
sake of the federal system of government. In the face of a significant economic emergency, even
such exclusive possession of authority might be called on to yield. This is clearly different from
the conception of exclusively power-allocation federalism, which underwrote the Court's
constrained readings of Congress's commerce-clause authority during the Great Depression, clearly
the most severe economic experience of the twentieth century. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238, 297-304 (1936).
107. Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
108. Id. at 851.
109. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976) (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 847.
111. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
112. Id.
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the U.S. Senate is based on selection by the legislatures of the several states." 3
Article I also grants state legislative bodies the authority to establish the "Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,"
although the time and manner, but not place, of elections may be revised by
Congress. 1
4
Apart from the role of particular state institutions in filling national political
institutions, the Constitution contemplates a state government as accountable to
those who constitute its political community." 5 For example, Article IV, Section
2 guarantees to a citizen of another state that she will enjoy "all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States."'"1 6 Scholars have interpreted the
Privileges and Immunities Clause to stand for the proposition of "inter-state
equality," which prohibits a state from treating citizens of sister states differently
than its own citizens.' 17 The Clause accounts for outsiders' political vulnerability
to the state's political process and thereby implicitly recognizes the importance
of the relationship that inheres between a state's citizens and that state's
governing apparatus. 118 The Constitution assumes that members of a political
community have the ability to affect the way in which they are treated by their
government and ties the state's treatment of them to the state's treatment of
outsiders to establish a floor below which the state may not fall.19
Alongside the protections of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the
Constitution guarantees to "every State in the Union a Republican Form of
Government."' 120  Although the Constitution is not explicit regarding what it
means by a republican form of government, supporters of the Constitution's
ratification described "the distinctive characters of the republican form."'
121
James Madison wrote, "[W]e may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow
that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly
from the great body of the people; and is administered by persons holding their
offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behaviour."' 2  The
Constitution's Guarantee Clause is an explicit declaration of federal protection of
state governments' structure, at least to the extent that these structures are
necessary to maintain the direct connection between the sovereignty of the
113. Similarly, Article II empowers state legislatures to appoint Presidential Electors for the
purpose of selecting the President. Id. art. I, § 1, cl. 2.
114. Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
115. Id.
116. Id. art. IV,§2, cl. 1.
117. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 251-54 (2005); JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 23 (1980).
118. AMAR, supra note 117, at 251-54; ELY, supra note 117, at 23-24.
119. This idea inheres from the Constitution's Guarantee Clause, which states that the United
States "shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." U.S.
CONST. art. 4, § 4.
120. Id.
121. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 33, at 251 (James Madison).
122. Id. See also Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican Governments and Autonomous States: A
New Role for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 815, 815-19 (1994) (discussing the outer
boundaries of the definition of a republican government).
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people over their respective state governments.' 23 Further, the Guarantee Clause
stands for the Constitution's recognition that state governments are political
communities, whose existence predates the Constitution's ratification. 24 But the
Guarantee Clause also stands for the position that recognizing states as political
communities is inextricably connected to their being controlled by a sovereign
People. 125  The Civil War and Reconstruction forced the Court to address the
difficult issue of legitimate state government as it had not before.
A. McCulloch v. Maryland: 126 National Political Relationship
The Court's decision in McCulloch v. Maryland affirmed the national
Union's supremacy by resorting to power allocation.' 27 But the legitimacy of the
sovereignty and supremacy of the Constitution and the national government's
other enactments, at least in their areas of constitutional competence, is derived
from the political relationship that the Constitution establishes between the
123. Deborah Jones Merritt has interpreted the text of the Guarantee Clause to place explicit,
though fairly narrow, limits on the kinds of impositions the national government can make on state
governments. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 2 (1988).
124. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 33, at 254 (James Madison) (describing the
plan for the Constitution's ratification as involving, in part, the "assent and ratification of the
several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people
themselves").
125. The argument regarding political community articulated in this essay relies on the
Guarantee Clause as a an operational principle in federalism's constitutional structure. The primary
obstacle to an argument based on the Guarantee Clause is the Court's holding that the Clause is
nonjusticiable. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1949) (holding that the political-question
doctrine prevented federal courts from entertaining suits seeking to enforce the Constitution's
Guarantee Clause). In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the State of New York
challenged the constitutional validity of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act's
requirement that state governments enact specific legislation to address the problem of radioactive-
waste disposal as inconsistent with the Guarantee Clause. Id. at 149. Although the Court did not
resolve the dispute on Guarantee Clause grounds, it admitted that it had not always been consistent
in holding that claims fell under the Guarantee Clause. Id at 183. See also Merritt, supra note
122, at 822-27. This analysis accepts Professor Merritt's contention that the Guarantee Clause that
a per se bar on the justiciability of claims brought pursuant to the Clause is unwarranted. The
argument offered in this article diverges from Merritt's arguments to the extent that they seem to
accept allocation of authority between the states and national government as the exclusive
mechanism of federalism enforcement. The relational model of federalism enforcement is perhaps
more consistent with a justiciable Guarantee Clause used as the basis for a principle that would
guide the judicial mediation of national-state federalism disputes. To the extent that the Guarantee
Clause does not allocate a specific set of powers to either the state or national government, it might
best be read as articulating a principle to guide the judiciary's examination of congressional
activities that might substantially affect the republican character of state governments. This is
different from using the Guarantee Clause as embodying a specific set of powers and authorities
possessed by either the national government or the states. For a fuller discussion of these issues,
particularly as they relate to rethinking the judicial role in federalism enforcement, see Copeland,
supra note 1.
126. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
127. See id. at 403-05.
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national government and U.S. citizens.128  "National sovereignty" has little
meaning apart from its status both as the product of the people's affirmative will
in ratifying the Constitution and as the continuous representative of the People in
its national institutions.
129
The clearest statement supporting the legitimacy of the national
government's supremacy is McCulloch's rejection of Maryland's assertion that
the Constitution does not emanate from the people, but from the states, and
consequently, its power "must be exercised in subordination to the states, who
alone possess supreme dominion.' 130 In rejecting Maryland's argument, the
Court said:
The Convention which framed the constitution was indeed elected by the State
legislatures. But the instrument, when it came from their hands, was a mere
proposal .... It was reported to the then existing Congress of the United States, with
a request that it might "be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each
State by the people thereof . This mode of proceeding was adopted; and by the
Convention, by Congress, and by the State Legislatures, the instrument was
submitted to the people.... No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of
breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of compounding the
American people into one common mass.... But the measures they adopt do not, on
that account, cease to be the measures of the people themselves, or become the
measures of the State governments.
From these conventions, the constitution derives its whole authority. The
government proceeds directly from the people; is "ordained and established" in the
name of the people ....131
Having rejected Maryland's misplaced state authority, the Court established
that the people are the heirs to the legitimacy that popular sovereignty bestows. 132
The states cannot direct the Union as though it were a dependent ward of the
state governments. 133 The national government is in full possession of a quantum
of sovereignty derived from the people. 13
4
128. Id. at 402.
129. For a discussion of the national legislature's status as the continuous repository of the will
of the people, see infra Part V.B.
130. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402.
131. Id. at 403 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 404-05.
133. Id. at 405.
134. Id. The claim that McCulloch affirms the Constitution's creation of a national political
community is not meant to suggest that the issue of national versus state citizenship was resolved
prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. Before the Amendment's ratification, the
conception of national citizenship was much contested. At the time of the ratification, "the idea of
a preeminent national citizenship was a radical repudiation of the state sovereignty theory ...
[which maintained] that Americans were state citizens first, and only secondarily citizens of the
Union." GARRETT EPps, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT FOR
EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 234-35 (2006). The first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment affirmed the idea of a national citizenship as against "federalist citizenship." The
post-Civil War era taught the Republicans in Congress the need to clarify the relationship at which
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The Court then turned to the basis of the Constitution's claim for
supremacy. 135 Justifying the Court's independent claim to sovereignty required
that the Court articulate the political relationship between the people and the
national government through their popular ratification of the document.' 36 To
establish the supremacy of the national government, however, the Court had to
recognize the states' role in ratifying the Constitution. 13' The Court did this by
emphasizing the role of the states "in their sovereign capacity" who, by
implication, assented to the document by calling conventions and submitting the
document for ratification by the people.1 38  The Court concluded, "The
constitution, when thus adopted, was a complete obligation, and bound the state
sovereigns.
'' 39
The Court's decision in McCulloch established the commitment of
constitutional authority to the national government's independent-sovereign
status, against the threats of state authorities.1 40  The political relationship
between the national government and the people establishes the national
government's status-that "the government of the Union ... is, emphatically and
truly, a government of the people., 141 Accordingly, the legitimacy of the national
government's claim to supremacy rests on assent from both the people and the
states.
B. Texas v. White: 142 The Recognition of States as Political Communities
In Texas v. White, the Court faced a suit filed in the Supreme Court by the
State of Texas seeking an injunction against the holders of federal bonds payable
to the State of Texas, which they acquired in 1851 as a settlement of certain
boundary claims. Texas argued that the bonds had been illegally transferred to
third parties by the Confederate government after Texas seceded from the Union
in 1861. Texas sought to prevent the bearers from receiving payment from the
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV gestured-i.e., the existence of a direct
relationship between national citizens and the national government. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 278 (1998).
135. See id at 404-05.
136. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
137. See id. at 404.
138. Id.
139. Id. The Court employed its inclusion of the "people in their conventions and their
respective states" again in its decision articulating the Supreme Court's authority to hear appeals of
state criminal convictions based on interpretations of federal law. See Virginia v. Cohens, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264, 380-81 (1821).
140. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 404.
141. Id.
142. 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 700 (1868). Although Texas v. White has been hailed as the Court's
"most definitive statement of the relationship between the states and the Union," it receives very
little attention in major constitutional-law casebooks. See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS (2006); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005); CHARLES A. SHANOR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
STRUCTURE AND RECONSTRUCTION (2003); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(2005); KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2007).
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United States Treasury and demanded the bonds' return to the State. The
defendants challenged the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit pursuant to its
original jurisdiction. They maintained that the Court could not hear Texas's
action because Texas's secession from the Union had disrupted its status as a
state within the meaning of Article III's jurisdictional grant. 43 The Court's
attempt to address this fundamental challenge to its jurisdictional authority,
which went to the very heart of the post-Civil War constitutional crisis, provides
central insights into the nature of American federalism, the state as a political
community, and the supremacy of the Constitution.
Before the Court determined whether Texas is a state within the meaning of
the Constitution, it first attempted to ascertain the nature of the state in abstract
terms. The Court's discussion is important because the Court offered a theory of
the nature of the state that has implications for limitations on legitimate state
authority. The Court declared that the term "state" has various meanings,
including "a people or community ... in political relations"; "a territorial region";
"the government under which the people live"; or a combination of "people,
territory and government."' 144 The Court concluded, however, that in all these
definitions, "the primary conception [of the state] is that of a people or
community." 145  The Court continued, "The people, in whatever territory
dwelling ... and whether organized under a regular Iovernment, or united by
looser and less definite relations, constitute the state."' 4
The Court moved from the abstract conception of the state to the more
concrete conception of the state within the meaning of the Constitution,
concluding that "state," as used in the Constitution, "expresses the combined idea
... of the people, territory, and government. A state, in the ordinary sense of the
Constitution, is a political community of free citizens, occupying a territory of
defined boundaries, and organized under a government sanctioned and limited by
a written constitution, and established by the consent of the governed."' 147
Although the Court had asserted that the term is a combination of conceptions of
people, territory and government, the Court declared that the "principal sense" of
143. See White, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 718-19. This question went to the very heart of the
Reconstruction logic of the radical Republicans. They argued that the former Confederate states
could not be seated in the Congress because their secession from the Union robbed them of their
status as states, thereby robbing them of their representation in the Congress. This argument was
completely opposite of the contention of Unionists both before and after secession, which rested on
the proposition that the Union was perpetual and inviolable, and there could be no such thing as a
constitutional right to secede. Unsurprisingly, the former Confederate states argued a position
directly opposite the one they argued before and during the Civil War. After their defeat, they
challenged the constitutionality of Reconstruction (including their exclusion from Congress) on the
ground that they remained a part of the Union, despite secession and formation of a separate
government. See MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS ON POLITICS
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA 147-48 (2006); Herman Belz, Deep-
Conviction Jurisprudence and Texas v. White: A Comment on G. Edward White 's Historicist
Interpretation of Chief Justice Chase, 21 N. KY. L. REV. 117, 124-25 (1993)
144. White, 74 U.S. at 720.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147 Id- at 721
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the term is that of "a people or political community, as distinguished from a
government."'' 48  The Court supported its conclusion that the Constitution
distinguished between the state and the government by pointing to the Guarantee
Clause of Article IV. The Court stated that the Constitution's guarantee that
every state should have a republican form of government expressed a "distinction
between a State and the government of a State."'
149
The Court's recognition of a distinction between the state's people, as a
political community, and the state government lays the foundation for the Court's
articulation of limits on the state government. Taking the Court's earlier
declaration, discussed above, of the Constitution as the representation of the will
of the people and the people's articulation of their fundamental law, the
Constitution stands in for the people, who are distinguishable from the
government. To the extent that the Constitution represents the highest will of the
people as their articulated fundamental law, any government that does not accord
with the Constitution does not accord with the people, and does not represent a
political community within the meaning of the Constitution.'
50
Having begun at a high level of abstraction, the Court was then faced with
the conundrum of determining whether Texas's secession from the Union
resulted in its relinquishment of its status as a state of the Union. The issue was
fraught with controversy because to declare that Texas is not a state would mean
accepting that Texas could have constitutionally seceded from the Union, a
position that Unionists rejected.'15 Conversely, to declare that Texas's status as a
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. It is not surprising that the Court would conceive of the state as separate from the
governing structure of the state, given the recent experience of the Civil War period. But just as
significant for the Court's conception of the state as separate from the government of the state was
the experience of the post-Civil War South. Before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Republicans in Congress grappled with what they saw as the takeover of the state governments
by "unrepentant Confederates" in the states reconstructed by President Andrew Johnson. ERIC
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 260 (1988). The
debate surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment's drafting included much controversy regarding the
decision to interfere directly with the politics of the former Confederate states. Foner noted that
Republicans in Congress sought to "conjure into being a new political leadership that would respect
the principle of equality before the law" by prohibiting from any office any Confederate who had
taken an oath of office before the war. Id. at 259. Foner noted that although Section 3 of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not seem to radically affect the representation of the former
Confederate states in Congress, it "made virtually the entire political leadership of the South
ineligible for office." Id. Although the Republicans maintained some commitment to the
federalism structure of the Constitution's original design, Republican leaders did not see this as
inconsistent. Id.
151. The Court's opinion represents an acceptance of Lincoln's rejection of secession, as
articulated in his First Inaugural Address. Lincoln declared, "I hold, that in contemplation of
universal law, and of the Constitution, the Union of these States is perpetual. Perpetuity is implied,
if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all national governments.... Descending from these
general principles, we find the proposition that, in legal contemplation, the Union is perpetual,
confirmed by the history of the Union itself." See First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in
LINCOLN: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 289 (1992). See also DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S
CONSTIruTIoN 79 (2003); Belz, supra note 143, at 125.
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state was unaffected by its act of rebellion against the Union, and therefore
remained a state without qualification, would undermine the constitutionality of
the Reconstruction program, which prohibited representatives of the former
Confederate states from participation in the House and Senate until they had been
deemed reconstructed by the Republican-controlled Congress. It is here that the
Court's earlier distinction between the state and the state government becomes
important in the Court's declaration of the conditional status of a state's
sovereign authority under the Constitution.
The Court rejected the proposition that Texas's secession could deprive it of
its status as a state, and the Court declared the indissoluble nature of the
"perpetual Union."'152 The Court went into great detail describing state officials'
actions after secession in rending the state's relationship with the United States,
and establishing a new relationship with the Confederate States of America. The
Court described conventions, legislative acts, and the adoption of ordinances and
resolutions. The Court explained the completeness of the State's withdrawal
from the Union: "In all respects, so far as could be accomplished by ordinances
of the convention, by acts of the legislature, and by votes of the citizens, the
relations of Texas to the Union were broken up, and new relations to a new
government were established for them."' 53 The Court continued by pointing out
that there were no Texas state officers who recognized the national government's
authority.
What did the Court make of all of these seemingly official state acts to
perfect an intent to secede from the Union? Keeping with its earlier conclusion
that the Union is perpetual and indissoluble, the Court deemed the acts as
"transactions under the Constitution.' ' 154 The Court found "the ordinance of
secession, adopted by the convention and ratified by a majority of the citizens of
Texas, and all the acts of her legislature intended to give effect to that ordinance
... absolutely null." This conclusion has two central points for our purposes.
First, the conclusion asserts the consequence of the Union's perpetual nature.
The Court's declaration that Texas's admission to the Union was "more than a
compact," but rather an adoption into a "political body." The finality of such
inclusion left Texas and the other states constituting the Confederacy "no place
for reconsideration, or revocation, except through revolution, or through the
consent of the States."'
' 55
Secondly, the Court's conclusion has larger ramifications for the potential
unconstitutionality of state official acts. Again, the Constitution represents the
People's highest expression of will. It stands as the fundamental law, ready to
chasten even when the People act in ways that are inconsistent with its dictates.
The Court's explicit detailing of the procedural formalities through which the
secession and subsequent activities passed did not accord, or the description of
the officialdom involved in these decisions does not endow them with the
152. White, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 725.
153. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 700, 724 (1868).
154. Id. at 726 (emphasis added).
155. For a qualified rejection of this statement, see MARK E. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD:
AMERICAN SLAVERY AND CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 167-99 (1998).
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imprimatur of constitutionality if they violate the meaning of the Constitution. 
156
The Court explicitly stated that the relations between the state and the national
government will vary depending on the whether the state adheres to its
constitutionally imposed obligation. The Court explained, "[T]he relations which
subsist while these [constitutional] obligations are performed [] are essentially
different from those which arise when they are disregarded and set at nought." It
is in recognition of such "new relations" that the Court identified as having
"imposed new duties on the United States" that the Court seems to affirm the
constitutionality of the Reconstruction Acts.
The Court's acceptance of the dramatic new powers of the national
government to reconstruct the former Confederate states is, however, articulated
in a way that emphasizes the states' status as political communities. 157 The Court
reasoned that the national government was empowered to reconstruct the states
based on the Constitution's imposition of a duty on the national government to
"guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government."' 5 8 The
Court declared that the newly reconstituted State of Texas was "entitled to the
benefit of the constitutional guaranty."' 59 This entitlement suggests a recognition
of the states-even the former Confederate states-as possessing attributes of
sovereignty. The Court suggested that the state's achievement of a republican
form of government rests, in part, on the principle of inclusion of the whole
people into the apparatus of the state, including freed slaves.'
60
Having recognized the states as political communities, the Court further
reoriented the conception of American federalism, even in the aftermath of a
more powerful post-Civil War national government. Alongside earlier Supreme
Court case law that declared that preserving the national government's
supremacy was the Constitution's central principle, White established the
preservation of the states as an equivalent constitutional value.' 6 ' The perpetuity
notwithstanding, the Court announced:
[T]he perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union by no means implies the loss of
distinct and individual existence, or of the right of self-government by the States.
Under the Articles of Confederation each State retained its sovereignty, freedom,
156. One need not agree that the Court has interpreted the Constitution correctly regarding the
right of secession. What is important for the argument's purposes is that the Court declared that
inconsistency with the Constitution's dictates transforms official acts into acts done without
authority.
157. White, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 722.
158. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
159. White, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 729.
160. See id.
161. It is significant that Chief Justice Salmon Chase, the author of Texas v. White, is credited
with crafting a states' rights defense: the right of non-slave states to refuse to enforce the Fugitive
Slave Law. Chase rejected the authority of the central government to impose the obligation to
protect slave interests on "free" states. The Court rejected arguments in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41
U.S. 539 (1842), upholding Congress's authority to enact the Fugitive Slave Act. See WILLIAM M.
WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 218-22
(1977); Michael Les Benedict, Salmon P. Chase and Constitutional Politics, 22 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 459, 466-67 (1997).
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and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right not expressly delegated
to the United States.... Not only therefore, can there be no loss of separate and
independent autonomy to the States, through their union under the Constitution, but
it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the States, and the
maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the
Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National
government. 1
62
The Court emphasized the duality of American federalism structure as one
that takes seriously both the national Union and the preservation of the states in
an enduring relationship. White articulated the dual nature of American
federalism, perhaps most prominently displayed in its declaration that "the
Constitution in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of
indestructible States." While indestructible, the states' governments, including
those with appropriate governance procedures, are subordinate to the dictates of
the Constitution. The sovereignty in which the states participate is conditioned
on acting in accord with the Constitution; when the state's actions are
inconsistent with constitutional dictates, the Constitution requires that the
government's actions be brought in line with the Constitution's mandates.
3. The Tension of Supremacy and Sovereignty in the Federal Relationship
The Constitution commits to an independent national government that has
both sovereignty and supremacy. Simultaneously, the Constitution commits to
distinct state governments that also have sovereignty. Thus, the Constitution
commits to the existence of both the Union and the states in a form that preserves
the legitimacy of their claims for supremacy and sovereignty/autonomy. The
allocation of power does not always resolve the tension between the
Constitution's dual commitments. 164 Once it is clear that state courts have the
authority to determine the cases that they may hear in their courts, an anti-
discrimination norm prohibiting state courts from refusing to hear federal claims
can neither be understood as an allocation of authority nor a denial of residual
authority in the state courts.
IV. SUPREMACY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN EXPARTE YOUNG
Having presented the model of relational federalism enforcement, what
follows is a reading of Ex parte Young through its lens. This reading focuses on
the way in which the Ex parte Young's resolution issues of state sovereignty,
Constitutional supremacy and political accountability to elucidate conceptions of
the duality of American federalism. 16  Young teaches us that the resolution of
162. White, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 729 (emphasis added).
163. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 27-111.
165. To be certain there are other ways of understanding Ex parte Young, each of which might
illuminate important aspects of various doctrines for which Young serves as an intersection point.
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federalism disputes always requires recognizing the tensions of the federal
structure of government, which respects the status of both the national and state
governments as distinct political communities. Even in the context of national
supremacy, Young teaches us that federalism disputes must take this fact into
consideration. Young's relational dimensions are seen in the Court's fusing of
principles of equity and federalism to determine whether a federal court can
enjoin a state criminal proceeding. The joining of these principles suggests a
concern for the integrity of state court systems as capable of resolving
constitutional disputes. The Constitution's supremacy is recognized simulta-
neously with the preservation of the state courts' constitutional role as enforcers
of constitutional guarantees. The Court's analysis suggests that circumventing
the state courts as forums for the protection of constitutional rights establishes the
inadequacy of state forums. 
166
This discussion demonstrates the connections between Ex parte Young and
Texas v. White. As in Texas, the Court in Young was faced with the issue of
constitutionally compelled respect for the states' special status within America's
federalism structure, while also needing to respect the Constitution's status as the
supreme law of the land from which no state government can separate itself.
Such an interpretation of the Young doctrine is significant because it suggests that
it is possible to resolve sovereign-immunity disputes without the need to
articulate absolute rights or vetoes possessed by either the national government
or the states. 1
67
Further, this part demonstrates the ways in which Young's relational
conception of federalism is informed by Texas v. White to the extent that Young
See, e.g., John Harrison, Ex parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REv. 989, 1014-15 (2008) (rejecting the
contention that Young stands as an exception to the principles of sovereign immunity and reading
Young as a traditional tool of equity jurisprudence); Sina Kian, Note, Pleading Sovereign
Immunity: The Doctrinal Underpinnings of Hans v. Louisiana and Ex parte Young, 61 STAN. L.
REv. 1233, 1235 (2009) (providing a reading of Young that emphasizes the central importance of
the common law pleading system on the decision, which affect conclusions that are reached
regarding its status as a sovereign immunity decision).
166. This is not to deny the fact that the Reconstruction Congress clearly thought state forums
inadequate to vindicate constitutional rights in certain contexts. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225 (1972) (upholding that suits brought under Section 1983 were not barred by anti-injunction
statutes). See also Aviam Soifer & H.C. Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing
Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L. REv. 1141 (1977) (discussing the suspicion of state courts during the
Reconstruction era).
167. Judicial recognition of state immunity does not create an absolute veto in all circumstances.
The Court has recognized, and continues to affirm, the proposition that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides Congress with the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1976). The Court's recent sovereign-immunity case
law has perhaps restricted Congress's use of its Section 5 authority through its imposition of a
congruence and proportionality requirement before Congress can abrogate state immunity via
Section 5. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372-74 (2001)
(invalidating Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act because it found that Congress had not
met the congruence and proportionality requirement). The congruence and proportionality
requirement might be likened to the equitable analysis undertaken in Young, which began with a
rebuttable presumption that the states will act consistent with the Constitution, thereby limiting the
extent of the national government's interference with its affairs, unless proven otherwise.
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accepts a bilateral obligation: the national government must respect the status of
the states in the federal system, and the states must respect the status of the
national government. Respect for the perpetual nature of the federal relationship
obligates the states to remain committed to their connection with the national
government. Similarly, national respect for the states requires that the national
government recognizes state independence, whose legitimacy is derived from the
states' status as separate political communities in the federal system, even as
constitutional obligations remain binding on state and national actors alike.
Finally, the Young doctrine's analysis of the limits of state authority rests on the
conception of the state as a political community, the authority of which is
measured by its accountability to the people.
A. Relational Elements of the Ex parte Young Doctrine
The Court's decision in Young begins with an analysis of the constitutional
challenge to the Minnesota statute, which collapses into an equitable analysis for
purposes of establishing whether injunctive relief is owed to plaintiffs.
Shareholders of a railroad company initially sought a federal-court injunction
against a threatened prosecution by the Minnesota Attorney General. The district
court enjoined the Attorney General from prosecuting the railroads under the
statute, but the Attorney General moved forward with the prosecutions and
consequently he was taken into federal custody on contempt charges. Attorney
General Young brought a habeas petition challenging his detention to the Court.
The Court's analysis of the facial challenge to the Minnesota statute was
similar to the one regarding the appropriateness of injunctive relief. The Court
began by describing the penalty that attached for violating the fare statute, which
made the sale of each ticket above the statutory maximum fare a separate
violation, and which carried the possibility of imprisonment for ninety days and a
fine of up to $5,000. The penalty attached to officers, directors, agents, and
employees, in addition to the company itself. The Court concluded that the
statutorily proposed penalties did not provide an adequate remedy for the
plaintiffs to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. The Court held that the
statute's imposition of such extraordinary fines upon parties "is in effect to close
up all approaches to the courts, and thus prevent any hearing upon the question
whether the rates as provided by the acts are not too low, and therefore
invalid.' '
68
The Court addressed the objection that the federal courts had no jurisdiction
to enjoin state criminal proceedings, by accepting the proposition's truth, but
declaring that the rule had exceptions. The Court stated that when a state
criminal proceeding "is brought to enforce an alleged unconstitutional statute,
which is the subject-matter of inquiry in a suit already pending in a Federal court,
the latter court," the federal court need not cede its jurisdiction and can exercise
its jurisdiction "to the exclusion of all other courts, until its duty is fully
168. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 148 (1908).
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performed."' 169 Further, the Court accepted the argument that where there is an
adequate remedy in the state courts, the federal court is prohibited from
exercising its equity jurisdiction. Relying on the same analysis that led to its
conclusion that the statute is facially invalid, the Court declared that there is no
adequate remedy at law to allow the railroads to challenge the statute's
constitutionality. The Court rejected the State's assertion that the defendants
could challenge the statute's constitutionality as a part of their defense during
prosecution.
The Court's analysis of whether the federal courts could appropriately
exercise jurisdiction in this instance decided the issue in favor of the authority of
the federal courts. The Court's analysis did, however, clearly take seriously the
state courts' role as protectors of constitutional rights. As stated above, the
analysis is meant to establish the inadequacy of state forums as a precondition of
the federal court's enjoining state-court proceedings. A plaintiff must first
affirmatively prove the state court is unable to provide an adequate legal remedy
for the vindication of the party's constitutional rights.
Simultaneously, the Court emphasized the vindication of constitutional-
rights guarantees as a central responsibility of both state and federal courts.
Separate from the inadequacy of the state forum is the constitutional invalidity of
the Minnesota statute. The Court clearly established that the Constitution binds
the state against violations of its citizens' constitutional rights. The Court's
analysis presumes the supremacy of the Constitution-binding on both national
and state actors. The Constitution establishes the law for the state, from which it
cannot be ejected, and from which it cannot free itself. The state's acts must be
answerable to the Constitution, whether they are adjudicated in the federal courts
or the state courts.
1 71
The national government's supremacy does not undermine the fact that the
states are integral to the constitutional scheme of government. This is further
exemplified by the Court's acknowledgment of the potential conflict between the
Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments. Rather than attempting to resolve the
conflict by determining that one provided either the states or the national
government with unlimited authority as against the other in the instant dispute,
the Court understood the Amendments as standing for two competing visions of
169. Id. at 161-62.
170. The Court's analysis of the state forum's adequacy also focused on the difficulty the
defendants would have in establishing that the passenger rates were too low. The Court concluded
that the defendants' defense "would require a long and difficult examination of quite complicated
facts ... [which] would be almost impossible to make before a jury." Id. at 164.
171. Professor Fallon described Young as having "inaugurated the modem era of dialectical
doctrinal development between the Nationalist and the Federalist extremes." Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REv. 1141, 1196 (1988). Fallon argued that
Young "lived, moved, and had its being in the assumptions and values of the Nationalist model" of
judicial federalism. Id. at 1197. While I accept Fallon's description of Young as perhaps standing
closer to the Nationalist pole than the Federalist pole in the axis of federal-courts ideologies, this
article's central contentions are that Young recognizes, perhaps to a greater extent than modem
revisers of federal-courts jurisprudence, the existence of opposition between two elements of our
federalism, and that Young rests on the recognition of the legitimacy of this tension, as is argued in
more detail below.
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the structure of American government, neither of which could have meaning
without some recognition of the other. 
172
B. The Young Doctrine's Recognition and Balance of Political Community
The Young doctrine rests on a theory that state governments are political
communities that have a unique relationship with their citizens. 73 Young also
recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment inaugurated a new relationship
between citizens and their state governments. 174  A state's violation of its
citizens' constitutional rights compromises the legitimacy of its claim to respect
as a political community, which must always be the context in which the state
participates in sovereignty.175 To this extent, Young represents a culmination of
the central founding-era commitment to the sovereignty of the people at every
level of government, articulated in the statements of the supporters of the
Constitution and in the Constitution's Guarantee Clause. 176 A reading of Young
that restores its connection to the founding-era principles of popular sovereignty
and conceptions of political accountability in state governments that Texas v.
White affirmed177 clearly rebuts the idea that the Young doctrine is an easily
dismissed fiction that can be ignored when inconsistent with other jurisprudential
objectives.
Young resolved the challenge to states' immunity from suit by their own
citizens, as promulgated in Hans, by stripping the state of the ability to endow its
actors with immunity. 178 The Court declared that "the use of the name of the
State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a
proceeding without ... authority of and one which does not affect the state in its
sovereign or governmental capacity. ' 1 79 Although many have criticized such
stripping as a fiction insofar as it fails to comport with the Court's Fourteenth
Amendment doctrine, which applies the Amendment only to acts attributable to
state actors,18° Young represents an obligation of the amended Constitution's
172. See Young, 209 U.S. at 157-58.
173. The idea that the states form a distinct political community from the national political
community clearly precedes the Constitution, as the states' status as political communities precedes
the national government. The Federalist clearly assumed that there would be a distinct relationship
between the states and their citizens from that which would exist between the national government
and its citizens. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison). See also Lane County v. Oregon,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868) ("The people of the United States constitute one nation, ... one
government.... On the other hand, the people of each State compose a State, having its own
government, and endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence.").
174. See Young, 209 U.S. at 149.
175. See id. at 155-56.
176. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. For discussion of the justiciability of the Guarantee Clause, see
supra note 125.
177. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 700, 720 (1868).
178. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908).
179. Id. at 159-60.
180. For a critique of constitutional law's obsession with doctrine, see generally Akhil Amar,
The Supreme Court, 1999 Term Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26
(2000).
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commitment to popular sovereignty and government accountability. The Young
Court did not simply fashion an expedient compromise in stripping the state actor
of the sovereign-immunity shield. Instead, it stripped the state's shield of
immunity where the state violates its own citizens' constitutional rights as an
abdication of the state's claim to sovereignty, because state sovereignty stems
from the legitimacy of its relationship with its citizens.' 8 Thus, the state actor in
Young was "stripped of his official or representative character.'' 82 The state and
its officials possess legitimacy, pursuant to the Constitution, only to the extent
that it is a republican form of government that represents the people as sovereign.
This connection between Young and White-based on White's contention that the
people are the state'83-suggests that injunctive suits are, like the Reconstruction
Acts, meant to reestablish a legitimate political relationship in the states. 84
Young need not be interpreted as invoking an exception to a preexisting state
immunity, but rather as confirming the basis of states' legitimacy as political
communities and the context in which any claims of sovereignty or autonomy
have any meaning at all.
The Court distinguished its decision from earlier decisions, which it
contended compromise state sovereignty more than the issuance of a federal-
court injunction against unconstitutional state action. The Young Court asserted
that the mere issuance of an injunction against a state denying it the authority to
engage in unconstitutional conduct does not undermine the state's sovereignty,
even as a suit that seeks both injunctive relief and specific performance by the
state to remedy its constitutional violation might interfere with such
sovereignty.18 5 What is worthy of emphasis in the Court's reasoning is that the
decision upholds the states' claims to sovereignty as conditioned upon their
continued status as legitimate regimes, a status that is forfeited as long as there
exists a continuing violation of the Constitution's mandates.
Finally, Young moved beyond White in at least one respect: among Young's
conditions for a legitimate political community is the state's recognition of its
citizens' simultaneous political relationship with the national government. 86
White's justification for the legitimacy of congressional authority during the
Reconstruction Era was the collapse of effectively functioning state governments.
In Young, the Court premised the legitimacy of the federal court's injunction
against allegedly unconstitutional state actions not on the absence of all political
authority, but rather on the state's compromise of its authority by performing acts
inconsistent with the Constitution. 8 T  Although the Court characterized the
state's actions as fomenting a conflict with the Constitution's superior authority,
the Constitution's supreme authority rests on its status as the legitimate
181. See Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56.
182. Id. at 160.
183. White, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 721.
184. Id.
185. Young, 209 U.S. at 187-88 (describing In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887), as a suit against
the state in its sovereign capacity).
186. See id. at 159-60.
187. See id.
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repository of the People's will. 188 Clearly, this is textually codified in the
Supremacy Clause, but it is confirmed by the process by which the Constitution
was enacted, and reaffirmed in the Fourteenth Amendment. 1
89
V. THE SOVEREIGN-IMMUNITY REVOLUTION
The Court's sovereign-immunity debate has revolved primarily around the
fundamental meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. 190 The majority of the
Rehnquist Court not only affirmed the broad reading of the Eleventh Amendment
from Hans v. Louisiana,19' but extended its interpretation of the Amendment to
include a constitutional limitation on federal-court jurisdiction.'9 2  The Court
interpreted the Eleventh Amendment's language as a symbol of a larger
constitutional limitation on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts
when faced with suits against state governments.' 93  The dissenters from the
Court's sovereign-immunity case law rejected this interpretation in favor of a
narrower interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment-reading the text as limiting
the federal courts' jurisdiction only where such jurisdiction is based on
diversity.
9 4
Much of the scholarly discussion around state immunity has largely
mirrored the Court's debate.' 95 One scholar described the debate over the
188. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123,155-56 (1908).
189. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404 (1819).
190. E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Young, 209 U.S. at 149-5 1.
191. 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) (holding states to be immune to suits brought by either citizens of
other states or foreign countries, or its own citizens).
192. See Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 65 (holding that Article I does not give Congress
the authority to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal courts under Article II1, which had been
limited by the Eleventh Amendment).
193. Id. at 66.
194. Id. at 82 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 301
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
195. Many scholars have reiterated support for the "diversity theory" of the Eleventh
Amendment. See William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1263 (1989); William A. Fletcher, A Historical
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of
Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1983);
John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1890-91 (1983); Vicki C. Jackson, One Hundred Years of Folly: The
Eleventh Amendment and the 1988 Term, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 51, 58 (1990). But see Lawrence C.
Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342, 1342-43
(1989) (stating that the diversity theory is "thoroughly unfaithful to the essentially unambiguous
dictates of the amendment's language"); William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1375 (1989) ("[D]iversity theorists
have not adequately supported their contention that a proper historical understanding establishes
that states should not be immune from federal question suits for monetary relief in federal court.
The ninety-nine years of jurisprudence built upon Hans creates a presumption in favor of the
current interpretation of state immunity. Review of the historical evidence and arguments, in turn,
establishes that the diversity theorists have not overcome the presumption.").
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Eleventh Amendment's meaning as one that is essentially about the question of
"how state sovereignty should be weighed against federal supremacy."' 196 This
debate, however, does not explicitly discuss the nature of the national-state
relationship at issue in sovereign-immunity case law. Other scholars have
addressed the relationship between the nation and the states as expressed in
sovereign-immunit case law, and it is primarily into this conversation that this
article intervenes.
The Rehnquist Court has defended its sovereign-immunity case law as
central to the protection of state sovereignty, which the Court declared was a
central element of the Constitution's original design.' 98 In Alden, the Court
affirmed that the "federal system established by our Constitution preserves the
sovereign status of the States." 199 Further, the Court stated that the Framers
"considered immunity from suits central to sovereign dignity. 20 0  The Court
supported its conclusion that immunity from suit was central to the states' status
within the constitutional framework by reference to the Eleventh Amendment as
evidence that "Congress acted not to change but to restore the original
constitutional design. 201 The Court stated: "[T]he Constitution was understood,
in light of its history and structure, to preserve the States' traditional immunity
from private suits. As the Amendment clarified the only provisions of the
Constitution that anyone suggested might support a contrary understanding, there
was no reason to draft with a broader brush.",
2 2
The Court has declared its sovereign-immunity jurisprudence to be
congruent with both the Constitution's original design and structure.20 3  The
Court stated, "[O]ur federalism requires that Congress treat the States in a
manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants
in the governance of the Nation., 20 4 According to the Court, sovereign immunity
205is consistent with the states' structural role in the federal system. The
"essential principles of federalism" are undermined if a state may be "thrust, by
federal fiat and against its will, into the disfavored status of a debtor, subject to
the power of private citizens to levy on its treasury or perhaps even government
196. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 409 (2003).
197. For scholarship discussing such a relationship, see, for example, Althouse, supra note 48,
at 631; Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953 (2000); Vicki C. Jackson,
Seductions of Coherence, State Immunity, and the Denationalization of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERS
L.J. 691 (2000); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory,
75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1027-47 (2000); Ernest A. Young, State Sovereignty Immunity and
the Future of Federalism, 1999 SuP. CT. REV. 1.
198. Alden, 527 U.S. at 756-58.
199. Id. at 714.
200. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999).
201. ld. at 722.
202. Id. at 724.
203. Id. at 748.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 749.
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buildings or property which the State administers on the public's behalf."20 6 The
Court has further justified its grant of immunity protection to states on the basis
of its conclusion that "suits for money damages ... may threaten the financial
integrity of the States. 2 °7  The recognition of Congress's power to enact
remedies that allow damages actions against states would "giv[e] Congress a
power and leverage over the States that is not contemplated by our constitutional
design. ',20 Therefore, according to the Court, state sovereign immunity is a
protection against the effective destruction of states, which might occur if they
were subject to damage payouts in private suits. 20 9
The Court's basic premise in its sovereign-immunity case law is the
Constitution's commitment to a federal structure, which demands that state
governments are respected as distinct political communities, is threatened by
congressional approval of private-damage suits. 210  Although the Court's
sovereign-immunity decisions have seemingly employed the same line-drawing
and power allocation as in Lopez, this part demonstrates the important relational
dimension of these decisions. Highlighting the relational elements of the Court's
sovereign-immunity jurisprudence assists in better understanding the Court's
decisions within the context of American federalism. To the extent that
relational federalism is aimed at policing the ways in which government
exercises otherwise legitimate substantive power, relational federalism seems
inconsistent with the articulation of clear rights-like vetoes over one level of
government's exercise of authority as against another. By appreciating the
relational dimension of the Court's case law, this analysis supports a critique of
the Court's establishment of states' seemingly absolute rights to veto federal
action, at least under the Commerce Clause.
Secondarily, this part demonstrates the role that the state's accountability to
its political community plays in the Court's immunity jurisprudence. The
Court's jurisprudence has emphasized the ways in which private suits for
damages undermine state accountability for the priorities favored by state
citizens. Because states' status as political communities is central to relational
conceptions of federalism, this is unsurprising. What is surprising is the Court's
failure to account for the status of the national government as a distinct political
206. Id.
207. Id. at 750.
208. Id. Scholars have challenged the Court's defense of its sovereign-immunity decisions on
financial-integrity grounds because they suggest that state governments are obligated to bear the
expense of complying with federal law, despite Congress's inability to delegate a right of action to
private parties. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 197, at 1031-33.
209. As explained above, the Court's state-protecting federalism jurisprudence has consistently
maintained that the Constitution commits to the protection of the separate and independent
existence of states, in part because the division of power and authority checks the tendency toward
tyrannical governments. Again, this reasoning for the Court's federalism jurisprudence has not
gone uncontested. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 41, at 659-64.
210. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750 (1999). See generally William P. Marshall & Jason S.
Cowart, State Immunity, Political Accountability, and Alden v. Maine, 75 NoTRE DAME L. REv.
1069 (2000) (explaining, and questioning, the role of the political-accountability argument in the
Court's sovereign-immunity case law).
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community, whose substantive policy priorities deserve similar recognition in the
policing of the national-state relationship. The Court's recognition of the state
communities is juxtaposed against its seeming neglect of the Constitution's
commitment to a corresponding national political community. The Court's
neglect leads to its inadequate recognition of the competing tension of the
national political community in its state immunity case law.
Finally, this part suggests the role that the above reading of Ex parte Young
might play in refining the Court's federalism equation. The Young doctrine's
consideration of federalism relationship ought to disabuse the Court and
commentators of the possibility of a simple resolution of federalism disputes.
The proper consideration of the competing claims, and the context of political
accountability in which they exist, may point the way forward in refining state-
immunity jurisprudence in the twenty-first century.
A. State Immunity as Relational Federalism
The Court's decision in Alden might be considered something of a victory
for supporters of Garcia's decision upholding the constitutionality of Congress's
expansion of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to regulate state
employment. 21 2 Alden clearly affirmed Congress's substantive power to impose
the FLSA's obligations on states.213 At first glance, this is significantly different
from the Court's holdings in Lopez and Morrison, in which the Court invalidated
214
congressional authority to legislate in certain areas.. Specifically, the Court's
holdings in these cases left Congress with less substantive authority under the
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment than it had when
it enacted the legislation at issue in each case.215  Beyond upholding
congressional authority to regulate state employment relationships pursuant to
the FLSA, Alden appeared to affirm the federal government's authority to
vindicate violations of federal rights by allowing the U.S. Government to bring
damages actions against states for violating the FLSA.21 6
211. For criticism of the Court's state-immunity case law along these lines, see Vicki C.
Jackson, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity, and the Denationalization of Federal
Law, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 691 (2000) (arguing that the Court's decisions evidence a distrust of the
political branches of the national government).
212. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-56 (1985). Professor
Meltzer has reached this conclusion as well. See Meltzer, supra note 197, at 1032.
213. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 759.
214. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 567-68 (1995).
215. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
216. In Seminole Tribe, the majority emphasized the fact that one of the alternatives to private
suits against states for the vindication of federal rights was suits by the national government
pursuant to United States v. Texas. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996).
In United States v. Texas, the Court stated:
We cannot assume that that the framers of the Constitution, while extending the judicial
power of the United States to controversies between two or more States of the Union, and
between a State of the Union and foreign States, intended to exempt a State altogether from
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How is Alden to be understood if the decision affirms such a significant
component of Congress's substantive authority? Alden narrows the range of
remedial options available to the national government in vindicating federal
rights. 217  Such a regulation of the means of effectuating a legitimately held
authority seems clearly based on something other than an allocation of power.
The Court's immunity case law suggests that the means by which Congress
effectuates its substantive norm is inconsistent with states' status in the
constitutional framework to the extent that it threatens to eradicate the states'
distinct status to which the federal system commits. 21 8 Alden appears to suggest
that the national government's duty to respect and care for the federal system is a
sufficient basis for curtailing its exercise of authority in a particular manner if it
would risk the federal system's survival.
B. State Sovereign Immunity and the Resolution of Relationship
The Court's fear that congressionally authorized damage actions will harm
the states stems from its contention that private-litigation damage awards infringe
on states' fiscal decision-making. 2'9 The recognition of states as distinct political
communities with distinct obligations to their citizens has a long lineage in the
Court's sovereign-immunity case law. In its 1883 decision in Louisiana v.
Jumel, the Court held that sovereign immunity barred suit against a state in an
action seeking recovery for the state's default on bonds.220 The Court's holding
was based, in part, on its conclusion that forcing the state to pay the debt at issue
would "require the court to assume all the executive authority of the State ...
until the bonds, principal and interest were paid in full .... It needs no argument
to show that the political power cannot be thus ousted of its jurisdiction and the
judiciary set in its place. ' 221 Jumel's emphasis on the state executive as the
embodiment of legitimate state political power, a power threatened by damage
suit by the General Government. They could not have overlooked the possibility that
controversies, capable of judicial solution, might arise between the United States and some of
the States, and that the permanence of the Union might be endangered if to some tribunal was
not entrusted the power to determine them according to the recognized principles of law.
143 U.S. 621, 644-45 (1892). The Alden dissent notes that section 216(c) of the FLSA authorizes
the Secretary of Labor to bring suit seeking damages against states that violate the Act. Alden, 527
U.S. at 810 (Souter, J., dissenting).
217. Alden, 527 U.S. at 758-60.
218. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
219. It is not altogether clear why damage actions awarded as a result of suits brought by the
national government are not similarly compromising for the Court. Scholars have argued that
injunctive relief commanding the state government to perform certain functions or refrain from
certain actions is no less of an infringement on state authority. See Roderick M. Hills, The Eleventh
Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic Power, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1225, 1249 (2001) (arguing that
state political actors are placed at a disadvantage as against state bureaucratic actors in suits
involving damage awards, and offering a justification for the allowance of injunctive suits instead
of damage actions on the ground that injunctive suits are less disruptive of the accountability of
state legislative actors).
220. 107 U.S. 711 (1883).
221. Id.at727-28.
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awards that force the redeployment of state priorities, is a repeating theme in the
Court's justification of its sovereign-immunity jurisprudence. 22
The Court's most explicit statement of the relationship between its
immunity case law and its conception of protecting states as legitimate political
communities, whose accountability to citizens must be defended against
government intrusion, is Alden's justification for state sovereign immunity. 3
There, the Court stated that congressional authorization of damage awards
"would place an unwarranted strain on the States' ability to govern in accordance
with the will of their citizens." 22 4 The Court continued:
[T]he allocation of scarce resources among competing needs and interests lies at the
heart of the political process. While the judgment creditor of a State may have a
legitimate claim for compensation, other important needs and worthwhile ends
compete for access to the public fisc. Since all cannot be satisfied in full, it is
inevitable that difficult decisions involving the most sensitive and political of
judgments must be made. If the principle of representative government is to be
preserved to the States, the balance between competing interests must be reached
after deliberation by the political process established by the citizens of the State, not
by judicial decree mandated by the Federal Government and invoked by the private
citizen....
... When the national government asserts authority over the State's most
fundamental political processes, it strikes at the heart of the political accountability
essential to our liberty and republic form of government.
2 2 5
222. The Court has also deployed the protection of state accountability in its anti-
commandeering case law, which has rebuffed congressional attempts to use state legislative and
executive bodies to achieve otherwise legitimate, regulatory goals. See Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (invalidating provisions of the Brady Handgun Act, which required state
agencies to temporarily perform background checks); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
185-86 (1992) (invalidating the Take Title provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Act because it required state legislatures to enact statutes taking title to low-level radioactive waste,
including liability for injuries caused by the waste, in the event of their failure to find alternative
ways to dispose of such waste). However, it should be noted that holding governments accountable
for damages may aid in protecting governmental accountability. Specifically, to the extent that
government actors might engage in violations without bearing a financial burden, their constituents
might not be fully affected by the consequences of their actions. If the full financial costs of
violations were imposed on the tax-paying public, they would be moved to remove such violators
from office. See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 157-58 (2000) (arguing that
the imposition of liability upon governments serves as a deterrent to government actions that harm
the public).
223. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750-51 (1999).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 751. The Court's attempt to construct a "political accountability"-understood as
both budgetary accountability and enforcement accountability-rationale as an independent
justification for its sovereign-immunity doctrine in Alden has been deemed a failure because it is
inconsistent with the current state of state-immunity doctrine. Marshall and Cowart argue that the
budgetary accountability is inconsistent with the fact that the doctrine continues to allow damage
suits to be brought against states by the national government, as these suits also have negative
effects on state government's budgetary priorities. Marshall & Cowart, supra note 25, at 1079-83.
They also argue that state budgets are affected by the availability of injunctive relief for private
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Representative state government, that is, republican government, is
226
constitutionally guaranteed to the states. If this guarantee means anything, the
Court reasoned, it means that the national government will not undermine a state
government's ability to effectively respond to the will of its citizens regarding the
use of public resources. 7 Demands for compensation for violations of federal
law are seen as undemocratic impositions on the state, which avoid the public
deliberative process as the result of litigation overseen by unaccountable
judges. The protection of state governments' representative character
underlies the Court's denial of congressional ability to authorize private damage
suits for violations of federal statutes.229
Alongside the Court's depiction of states as political communities, however,
the Court characterized the federal statutes protecting myriad individual rights as
"judicial decree s mandated by the Federal Government and invoked by the
private citizen." ( Against the depiction of a state government whose collective
decisions are reached after "deliberation" and "the balanc[ing] between
competing interests," federal rights and the government that enacts them appear
to be foreign entities with no authentic connection to the people to whom the
state is ultimately accountable.2 3' The Court's recognition of the states as
political communities does not seem to carry over to its depiction of the national
government. 32  The Court seems almost ignorant of the fact that the national
government's statutory enactments are often the result of similar deliberation and
plaintiffs. Id. Regarding enforcement accountability-the idea that suits by the national
government is better than delegation of such authority to private litigants-Marshall and Cowart
argue that it is inconsistent with the retroactive-prospective divide in the current state-immunity
doctrine. Id at 1084-87. Marshall and Cowart's arguments would appear to deal a significant
blow to the argument that Young's recognition of these accountability rationales plays a role in
sustaining this article's contention that Young takes the duality of federalism seriously. However,
the central argument of this essay is that Young involves multiple federalism values, one of which
is the protection of states as political accountable units of government. To the extent that Marshall
and Cowart's project is aimed at finding a single underlying justification for the Court's current
state-immunity doctrine, it is inconsistent with this article's more multi-faceted approach to the
Court's federalism enforcement, including state immunity. Even from the single perspective of
state accountability, there might be justification for the Court's immunity doctrines that is not
limited to conceptions of accountability that Marshall and Cowart offer, but extend to
accountability for state elected officials versus state bureaucratic officials. Roderick Hills has
offered a justification of the Court's state immunity doctrine as protecting "elected nonfederal
policy generalists" versus "state agency specialists." Hills, supra note 219, at 1227. Hills's
argument makes sense of the damages-injunctive relief divide by explaining that injunctive relief
produces a mandate that may fall on the state agency obligated to obey the mandate versus damage
relief that would have costs on the entire state budget.
226. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
227. Alden, 527 U.S. at 748-50.
228. To the extent that Alden is a case about state courts, whose judges are often elected, the
majority's juxtaposition of the unaccountable judiciary and the deliberative, democratically
accountable legislature is somewhat disingenuous.
229. See id. at 750.
230. Id. at 751.
231. Id.
232. See id. at 750-51.
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interest-balancing that the Court lauded as the very epitome of representative
government when they take place in the states.
The Court's silence with respect to the nature of federal statutes suggests a
diminishment of the national legislature as a body representing the whole of the
American people. This depiction is at odds with its decision in U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, in which the Court invalidated an Arkansas constitutional
amendment that imposed term limits on the state's congressional
representatives.2 33 The Court held that states are without authority to expand the
qualifications for eligibility of either house of Congress, despite their authority to
234regulate the times, places, and manner of elections. The Court invalidated
Arkansas's amendment based on the Constitution's grant of congressional
authority to modify state-established election regulations, and based on its
holding in Powell v. McCormack that the Constitution is the sole source of
qualifications for eligibility for Congress.235
Though the Court primarily relied on textual and precedential authority to
support its decision, the Court also interpreted the Framers' intent to establish a
national government that would be accountable to the people of the United States
as a whole, rather than the people of a collection of separate states.236 According
to the Court:
In adopting [the Constitution], the Framers envisioned a uniform national system,
rejecting the notion that the Nation was a collection of States, and instead creating a
direct link between the National Government and the people of the United States.
In that National Government, representatives owe primary allegiance not to the
people of a State, but to the people of the Nation.... [E]ach Member of Congress is
"an officer of the union, deriving his powers and qualifications from the
constitution, and neither created by, dependent upon, or controlled by, the states....
Those officers owe their existence and functions to the united voice of the whole,
not of a portion, of the people."
237
Though the Court relied on the above statement to deny a state the authority
to set the qualifications of the national legislature's members, the Court's
statement implies a larger principle-the Constitution established a national
government clearly accountable to, and established by, the people of the United
States. Read in this light, the Court's silence about the political relationship, and
corresponding accountability, between the people and their national government
mars the Court's immunity case law.
233. 514 U.S. 779, 837-38 (1995). Arkansas voters approved an amendment to the state's
constitution prohibiting any person who had served three or more terms in the U.S. House of
Representatives from having his or her name on the ballot for election to that chamber. Id. at 783-
84. The amendment also prohibited the name of anyone who had served two or more terms in the
U.S. Senate from appearing on the ballot for election to that body. Id. at 784.
234. Id. at 837-38.
235. Id. at 795-98 (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969)).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 803 (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 627, at 462 (Little, Brown & Co. 5th ed. 1891) (1833)) (internal citations omitted).
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The national government's commitment to the propositions that workers
should be paid a minimum wage, no matter who their employer, and workers
should be able to vindicate this right in their individual capacity is not merely the
result of a judicial decree.238 Rather, it is the commitment of the national
legislature made on behalf of the people of the Union. Surely no less
deliberation and balancing of competing interests went into the enactment of the
amendments to the FLSA than would go into the legislative activities of the state
legislatures.
The Court's declaration of an absolute veto right against all but a few
private damage actions is made easier by the value that the Court places on the
states' status as political communities versus its (lack of) consideration for the
national government's similar status. The Court's ability to declare that "the
need to promote the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated to the
constitutional immunity of the States," 239 rather than a mutual accommodation of
national supremacy and state sovereignty, undermines the Court's effort to enlist
immunity doctrine to protect the federal structure of government. That state
sovereignty must be effectuated by the veto power of absolute immunity is not
justified by claims of faithfulness to the federal structure of government, which
resists the resolution of federalism disputes without cognition of how they will
affect the functioning of the overall federal structure, including the status of the
unit in the federalism equation.
C. Ex parte Young's Avoidance of the Tyranny of Resolution
The Young doctrine avoids reaching a resolution to the dilemma that
sovereign immunity poses for national supremacy and the vindication of federal
rights. Young addresses the dilemma as moving in both directions-national
supremacy and state sovereignty. 240  It does not, like the Court's modem
immunity case law, pay lip service to federalism's duality while denying the
legitimacy of the national government's claim to a political relationship with the
people to whom it must remain accountable. The Young doctrine's articulation
of a sovereignty conditioned on the state's maintenance of a legitimate political
relationship with the people, and its assumption that the state forfeits its
representative character when it violates its citizens' federally guaranteed rights,
undermines claims that it assumes the state's possession of an absolute veto
against private damage suits authorized by Congress.
The Young doctrine showcases a clear respect for the rightful vindication of
federal rights. Young also clearly appreciates the need to protect state
governments, as distinct political communities, against threats that undermine
their viability. The threat that damage awards may deplete a state's treasury and
thus undermine the state's ability to provide services essential to its political
238. On the role of Congress's role in protecting, among others, the rights of workers and racial
minorities better than the courts, see REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (2006).
239. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984).
240. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167-68 (1908).
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relationship with its citizens has long roots in our nation's history. Nevertheless,
these dangers call for something far less blunt than endowing states with an
absolute veto against private damage suits. A relational model of federalism, as
against a power-allocation model, might justify a return to the judicial imposition
of clear-statement rules on Congress's attempt to statutorily authorize private
damage suits against state governments.2 4' One might imagine judicial
imposition of caps on damages--either in absolute dollars or as a percentage of
state general-fund reserves-that would insulate essential state services from the
threat of potentially crippling damage awards.242 Further, a relational conception
might borrow from other federalism enforcement mechanisms, such as official
immunity doctrines, to require plaintiffs to make particular showings before a
court will impose damage awards against state governments, or allowing for
good-faith exceptions where states have not flagrantly violated the Constitution's
rights guarantees. This is all to suggest that relational conceptions of federalism
enforcement might provide additional ways for protecting the integrity of state
governments without endowing states with vetoes that threaten to allow them to
free themselves from the dictates of accountable governance.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has aimed to recast the reading of the Court's seminal decision
in Ex parte Young in light of its connection to the struggle over judicial
enforcement of the Constitution's dual commitment to national supremacy and
state sovereignty and autonomy. Young simultaneously recognized the
supremacy of national law and the importance of the continued protection of the
integrity of the legitimate political communities that states represent, resulting in
a decision that takes the relational dimension of American federalism seriously.
National supremacy can never allow a solution that completely obliterates state
government, and state autonomy can never allow states to flout the dictates of
their constitutional obligations to their citizens. This dimension resists the notion
that federalism, or its judicial review, is exclusively about the allocation of
power. The relational model requires taking the enduring relationship between
the national government and the states seriously, even where substantive
regulatory power is uncontested. This recasting of Young allows us to see that its
embodiment of the Constitution's commitment to national supremacy and state
241. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985) (holding that statutes
would be interpreted to have authorized private damage actions against states only if there was a
clear congressional statement). See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 469-70 (1991)
(applying a "plain statement rule" of statutory construction to federal legislation that "intrudes upon
traditional state authority"); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 232 (1989) (requiring an
"unequivocal declaration" of congressional intent to exercise its power to abrogate state immunity).
242. See generally James Leonard, Ex parte Young and Hard Times, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 889
(2009) (arguing that during hard economic times, Congress should provide a monetary cap on
courts' application of the Ex parte Young doctrine). Courts might, for example, engage in analyses
of a state's ability to pay using statements that state officials have made in non-litigations contexts,
such as statements made to credit-rating agencies or investment banks responsible for taking the
states to the public bond market.
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sovereignty recognizes both entities' status as distinct political communities
accountable to their respective citizenries. This understanding allows us to see
how Young need not be interpreted as merely "accommodating" national
supremacy, but as a vindication of such supremacy, and its mutual
accommodation of it and state sovereignty. I hope this understanding
demonstrates the extent to which the Court's current state-immunity case law
departs from Young's dual commitments. Satisfying these commitments need
not bind us to a resolution that endows state governments with an absolute veto
against congressionally authorized private damages actions.
